GENERAL CROOK'S FIRST ADMINISTRATION IN ARIZONA 1871-1875

A Thesis

Presented to the Department of History

University of Southern California

In partial fulfillment

of the

Requirements for the

Degree of Master of Arts

By

Blanche Marie Morgan

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This thesis, written under the direction of the candidate's Faculty Committee and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by the Council on Graduate Study and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Secretary

Dean

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Faculty Committee

Professor Hammond
Chairman

Professor Coy

Professor Hill

PREFACE

The purpose of this thesis is to give a survey and an evaluation of the first administration of General George Crook in Arizona, rather than to make an exhaustive study of the genesis of the Indian troubles in that region. An understanding of the situation existing is necessary for the treatment of the subject, and an attempt to give this understanding is made in the first chapter, in which the conditions existing from the year 1860 to 1871 are portrayed. No attempt is made to trace the ethical principle of the beginning of hostilities or the ownership of the territory; the established fact that Americans were being massacred under the American flag is accepted, even though the Indians also were being massacred under that same flag.

The missions of Vincent Colyer, secretary of the board of Indian commissioners, and of General O. O. Howard, also a member of that board, in 1871 and 1872, respectively, are reviewed, as both missions bear a direct relationship to the administration of General Crook, especially in that the character of these missions bore such a distinct contrast to the method employed by him and in that their failure proved the necessity for his campaigns which immediately followed the completion of Howard's work.

It has been said that the time and circumstances

were ripe for the successful termination of the Indian difficulties and that another man at this time could have accomplished what was accomplished by Crook, but it seems to me that, in view of the previous record of Crook and the record which he made in his following command, this statement would diminish the honor and gratitude rightfully due the greatest of all great Indian fighters. It should also be taken into consideration that the commanders preceding him were in no way restrained, as he was for a period of over a year, that they were urged to go ahead, and yet no such campaigns as he launched were instituted or results which he obtained forthcoming.

The only available material of any value on this subject is source material found in the annual reports of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Interior, with accompanying documents, newspapers of the period, and the work of John G. Bourke, On the Border with Crook, which gives the description of the campaigns which cannot be obtained from any other source. If General Crook wrote letters concerning these campaigns, I have not succeeded in locating them. Bancroft gives very little in this specific field, and although Farish, McClintock, and De Long were consulted, they are of no practical value. Such books as J. Ross Browne, Cozzens, and Mowry wrote serve their purpose for local color, but they do not go beyond that. The government documents are far more complete on the missions of Colyer and Howard than on the work of Crook, whose reports

are exceedingly brief and lacking in detail, one of which was not printed and had to be obtained in photostatic copy from the War Department. The newspapers of the Territory presented a more detailed record, and of course present the viewpoint of the people, which may at times, especially considering the life-and-death nature of the situation, seem biased. Bourke's book is accurate and complete concerning the campaigns themselves, and it is the most authoritative material on the subject. John C. Cremony, Life among the Apaches, may also be credited, because of his experience in Arizona, which extended over a period of years, and because of his veracity, although his bitterness against the Apache is obvious.

B. M. M.

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Chapter I

ARIZONA AND THE APACHES

Introduction

Needless to say, the coming of the white man to Arizona filled the savage with alarm. Previous to the arrival of American citizens in the Territory, the Apaches preyed upon the citizens of Mexico and upon other Indian tribes, as they chose. Had they suffered at the hands of the Mexicans? At times, no doubt, they did, and at times they suffered at the hands of the Americans; but if Arizona were to be occupied by American citizens, the Apaches had to be subdued. Living upon the bounties of nature or upon their neighbors made little difference to them. No human life was safe. The prospector in the mountain took his life in his hands when he searched for ore; the farmer's life was endangered each time he went to the field, although he did so with a cocked revolver on his hip and a loaded rifle slung to the plow handle; no traveler or mailcoach was certain of reaching a safe destination; women and children in the homes were in danger of being surrounded and murdered, or kidnapped, which was much more terrible. As soon as a robbery or murder was committed, the Apaches fled to their mountain strongholds; here it was almost useless for other than men of their own race to track them; in fact, pursuit by the troops alone was practically impossible. The Indians knew every mountain and

canyon, and into these they fled, leaving no trail for the soldiers to follow. It was a game of hide-and-seek, in which all the advantages were on the side of the natives; and thus it was to remain until there was concerted action on the part of all the troops in the Territory, backed by an efficient organization and a definite policy and determination to put an end to wholesale massacre and murder.

From 1860 through 1870 the Apache atrocities mounted continually. There were numerous scouts against them, but as long as they could flee to the mountains for protection while their families were under the protection of the troops, being fed at the expense of the Government, these raids continued; sometimes these scouts were successful, sometimes not. The Apaches struck simultaneously at many different points, making action on the part of the few troops in the Territory in an organized attack difficult. Thus unhampered, the Apache, without scruples for property rights or care for human life, robbed, pillaged, destroyed, captured, kidnapped, tortured, murdered, massacred. He was not content to steal, but he must destroy that which he did not steal; not content to murder, he must also mutilate the bodies of his victims in the most inhuman manner.

Bancroft[1] gives the number of Indians in Arizona in 1863-64 as twenty-five thousand, about two-thirds of these belonging to the friendly tribes and the remainder belong-

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[1] H. H. Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 543-5.

ing to the Apaches. The Yumas, whose strength had been broken in 1857 in a war with the Pimas, lived about the junction of the Gila on both sides of the Colorado. The Mojaves, whose hostility to the Americans ended with their defeat and the founding of Fort Mojave in 1858-59, lived above Williams Fork; Poston, superintendent of Indian affairs in 1864, selected a reservation on the Colorado in latitude 34°, intended not only for the river Indians, but also for the Hualapais and Yavapais; however, only the Chemehuevis and half of the Mojaves ever lived upon it permanently.[2] The Hualapais, or Apache-Yumas, and Yavapais, or Apache-Mojaves, northwest of Prescott, were friendly toward the Americans, but in 1860 they went on the war-path and remained unfriendly until 1871-72. The Suppai, or Ava-Supies, lived in the north, above latitude 36°; they were few in number and were rarely visited by white men. The Moquis, cliff-dwellers, living in the northeastern portion of Arizona, were temperate and industrious, causing no trouble. The Pimas and Maricopas, living on the Gila, had a reservation set apart for them in 1859. An industrious, agricultural people, living in a dozen villages of willow huts, they had always been enemies of the Apache and friends of the Americans. The Papagoes, regarded as the best Indians in the Territory, lived near Tucson and to the south; although they had trouble with the Spaniards and Mexicans, they

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[2] The Apache-Yumas and Apache-Mojaves were offshoots of the Yuma and Mojave tribes, but these particular bands lived to the east of the original bands and were related to the Apaches by intermarriage.

had always been friendly toward the Americans but hostile toward the Apaches.

The Apaches inhabited that portion of Arizona lying east of the Santa Cruz in the south, and of the Verde in north. For several years previous to 1864 the Apaches waged war against the whites in the southeast, then occupied by the Americans; but in 1862 the Colorado gold placers drew miners, the territory around Prescott began to be populated, and, consequently, from 1865 the Apaches spread their depredations into the northwest, and the Hualapais and Yavapais joined in the hostile acts. The Apaches proper may be divided into three branches, Coyotero, or White Mountain Apaches, Tonto, and Pinal Apaches. The Coyoteros inhabited the White Mountain region; the Tontos, the Tonto Basin; and the Pinals, the southeastern portion of the Territory, although their depredations extended into Mexico and New Mexico.

Cochise[3] was the noted chief of the Chiricahuas, a band of Pinals inhabiting the Chiricahua Mountains, whose raids extended many miles in all directions. Although Cochise was friend and adviser of Mangus Colorado,[4] war-chief of the

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[3] Charles T. Connell, "The Apache, Past and Present." Tucson, Arizona Citizen, April 10, 1921.

[4] "The northern portions of Chihuahua and Sonora, large tracts of Durango, the whole of Arizona, and a very considerable part of New Mexico were laid waste, ravished, destroyed by this man [Mangus] and his followers. A strip of country twice as large as all California was rendered almost houseless, unproductive, uninhabitable by his active and uncomprising hostility." John C. Cremony, Life among the Apaches, 177. (Cremony was interpreter for the United States Boundary Commission in 1849-51, and he was a major of the California volunteer cavalry, operating in Arizona and New Mexico during

Warm Springs Apaches[5] and heralded as tribal chief of all the Apaches, he saw the futility of opposing the whites; consequently, he lived in peace with the settlers and the officials of the Overland Stage Company until 1860, the year in which Mickey Free, a half-breed, had been captured along with some stock. Lieutenant Bascom, who had recently arrived from West Point, was dispatched with a company of soldiers to get Cochise in order to require of him the return of the stock and Mickey. Cochise claimed to know nothing of the depredation, but he thought the capture had been made by some Coyoteros and promised to see what could be done about it. Bascom was not satisfied but declared that Cochise, his brother, and the other two Indians at the conference would be held as hostages. Cochise, who felt differently about the matter, cut his way out the back of the tent and fled, leaving the others in the hands of the soldiers. And thus had begun twelve years of relentless warfare against the Americans by Cochise and his Chiricahua

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the Civil War.) Mangus had married a Mexican captive, and through her he had three daughters, one of whom married the chief of the Navajoes, who could command 3,000 warriors; another married the chief of the Coyoteros, and the third, the chief of the Mescalero Apaches. These women had great influence with their husbands, who became trusted allies of Mangus in his work of devastation. Mangus met Carleton's Column from California in several engagements and was finally captured and killed in an attempt to escape. The Indians obtained their rifles and revolvers from frequent and extensive massacres and robberies of immigrant trains. A strip of territory of northern Chihuahua and Sonora was under their control, and, depredating in one state, they would take their plunder into the other and there exchange for arms and ammunition.

[5] This band inhabited southern New Mexico.

Apaches. In southeastern Arizona ranches were destroyed, homes burned, pioneers and prospectors ambushed, stock run off, business abandoned in the settled portions of the San Pedro, Sonoita, and Santa Cruz. Mining operations were suspended and the stage line abandoned; for the troops were inadequate protection, as there were only two posts in all the vast territory now known as Arizona, then as part of New Mexico -- one on the Sonoita, Fort Buchanan, and the other on the San Pedro near the mouth of the Arivaipa, Fort Breckenridge, later Old Camp Grant. Cochise bid fair to rival Mangus as a dreaded chief by the whites, for he was chief of one of the most warlike, daring, and cruel bands of the Apache nation.

A considerable portion of Governor Goodwin's message[6] to the First Territorial Legislature, 1864, concerned the Apaches. Although the peaceful Indians were in the hands of the Department of the Interior and the hostiles under the control of the military under the Department of War, the governor felt that the people should take some means of defending themselves. The following paragraph from his message sets forth the conditions:[7]

> When the troops were removed from this territory at the commencement of the rebellion, it was nearly depopulated by their murders. They have made southern Arizona and northern Mexico a wilderness. . . It is useless to speculate on the origin of this feeling -- or inquire which party was in the right or wrong. It is

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[6] G. H. Kelly, Legislative History of Arizona, 1864-1912, 7-10.

[7] Ibid., 10.

> enough to know that it is relentless and unchangeable. They respect no flag of truce, ask and give no quarter, and make a treaty only that, under a guise of friendship, they may rob and steal more extensively and with greater impunity. As to them one policy only can be adopted. A war must be prosecuted until they are compelled to submit and go upon a reservation.

Acting-Governor McCormick in his speech[8] the following year considered the Apaches the chief obstacle to the development of the Territory.[9] In his message to the Third Territorial Legislature,[10] 1866, he spoke concerning the Apaches:

> The conflict with the Apache continues, and will continue, I fear, until we are supplied with troops better suited to fight him.

He spoke highly of the volunteers[11] and had written the Secretary of War, asking that they be retained; the letter had been referred to President Grant, who had replied that there was no law providing for volunteers. The governor went on to say:[12]

> Whatever increase may be made in the military force in the territory, and however zealous and intelligent those in command may be, I have little faith in any marked or substantial success in the subjugation of the Apache, until authority is given to employ the right material and in sufficient strength to maintain con-

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[8] Kelly, Legislative History of Arizona, 1864-1912, 13-16.

[9] Ibid., 19-23.

[10] Ibid., 21.

[11] In 1865 General John S. Mason was placed in command in Arizona with the volunteers from California and four companies from Arizona, two of them composed of Pimas and Papagoes. In 1866 he reported nine hundred Apaches on temporary reservation at Camp Goodwin, and he believed that food and protection on the one hand and incessant action of troops on the other would gradually result in permanent peace; however, these volunteers were withdrawn and Mason removed in May or June, 1866. Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 555,556.

[12] Kelly, op. cit., 23.

certed, continuous, and harrassing movements against him from many points in the territory -- a systematic and unintermitting aggressive war.

In January of 1866 Superintendent George W. Leihy[13] reported that the military had done little toward subduing the Apache. The plans to colonize the river Indians, the Hualapais, and Yavapais upon the Colorado River reservation, set apart in 1864, had failed because of lack of funds, but a number of Mojaves had been induced to plant; the renegade Hualapais and Yavapais were depredating in the vicinity of Prescott.

By 1867 matters had become so serious that the Legislature sent a memorial[14] to Congress requesting that the governor be given authority to raise a regiment of volunteer cavalry; their request, however, was denied. The following excerpt is taken from the Arizona Miner,[15] September 13, 1867:

> Our citizens are almost daily massacred, our property stolen, and in consequence our business enterprises are at a standstill, and all for want of that protection which is due to us from our Government, and which it is our right to demand. . . It is useless to 'whitewash' Indian matters any longer. Either we must leave the country in their possession, give them up the homes we have built for ourselves, lower the standard of civilization, and emigrate to some place where murder is a crime, and where murderers are punished.

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[13] Superintendent Leihy and his clerk were massacred by the Tontos in November, 1866, within twelve miles of Prescott. It was thought that Mr. Leihy fell into their hands alive, as his arms and legs were broken in several places, his heart was torn out, and his head mashed with rocks into a jelly. Report of John Feudge, special Indian agent, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1867, 167.

[14] Kelly, Legislative History, 28-30.

[15] Prescott.

This same paper, in the issue for September 30, 1867, printed an excerpt from the San Francisco Call, in which the California press expressed the attitude of the people toward the management of the Indians, a portion of which follows:

> It cannot be denied that Sherman's [General of the Army] management of Indian affairs has resulted in the greatest failure of the day. . . the Indians have constantly grown in strength in spite of him. . . We should give the Indians to understand that they must respect life and property. . . A war of extermination against the Indians would be better for all, than the merciless and continuous butcheries that have been going on.

The general attitude of the people of Prescott and the greater portion of Arizona at this time was expressed in the following:[16]

> Short work, very short work, may be made of the Apache and of all hostile savages if Congress will but realize their true nature. Our Indian troubles at this time are not because of a lack of power to suppress them on the part of the nation, but rather from a lack of will. For some reason or other the officials of the Government at Washington fail to comprehend the utter worthlessness of the Indians and the folly of handling him with kid gloves and rose water.

The Peace Commission was formed in 1867 for the purpose of seeing that the Indians received fair treatment and of persuading them to live on reservations,[17] but the efforts of this commission and of the Bureau of Indian affairs were

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[16] Prescott, Miner, November 9, 1867.

[17] E. L. Sabin, General Crook and the Fighting Apaches, 73. In 1869 this commission was made permanent. This action was brought about by a desire to establish a benevolent and uniform policy for the improvement of the Indians. During Stoneman's command temporary reservations were set apart through the influence of the commission. Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 561.

not successful, and the hostiles remained on the war-path.

In his last message[18] to the Territorial Legislature, November, 1868, Governor McCormick[19] called attention to the fact that the policy of the Government in regard to the Apaches had produced no noticeable results, as they were as formidable and successful as ever before. He considered that even though more forces should be sent, as they had been from time to time, and the Territory made a separate department, as it should have been before, there would need to be another policy, one of continuous and aggressive operations against the hostiles, in order to overthrow them completely and save the Government untold expense, as well as numberless lives of the people.

In the issue of July 17, 1869, of the Arizonian,[20] we read:

> We are, today, to a greater extent the victim of his [the Apache's] ravages than at any former time. . Nothing has been done which can lead us to hope for any important change.

There follows a list of depredations committed within a radius of less than two hundred miles of Tucson since January 2, 1868, a period of eighteen months, a sum of forty-two depredations. The following issue, July 22, reads:

> It will be seen that 52 persons have been murdered,

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[18] Kelly, Legislative History, 34-40.

[19] He had been elected as delegate to Congress in November.

[20] Tucson.

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that 18 have been wounded and two [illegible] wrote:
captivity. . . making a loss of ove[illegible]
an adult population, and probably a [illegible]
centage in loss of property. . .

The number of the military are suf[illegible]
guard the posts and send out small scouts
strength to follow them upon their own grou[illegible]
this done of course there can be no peace.

Governor A. P. K. Safford[21] saw the necessity for a [illegible] and of striking at the Indians in their own homes as the[illegible] only way of subduing them.[22]

Brevet Major General E. O. C. Ord, commander of the Department of California, in his report for 1869,[23] said of the cost of this Territory to the Government:[24]

> There are fourteen posts in Arizona, with an average garrison of one hundred and fifty men each, or two thousand one hundred men. There are in the Territory three thousand three hundred horses and mules. . . and the cost to the Government is not far from $3,000,000 per annum.

The efforts of the past year had been directed to the

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[21] Safford was appointed governor April 7, 1869. Kelly, Legislative History, 42.

[22] "The constant raids of the Apaches, and insecurity of life and property in every portion of the Territory seem to call for some action on my part. . .

"Experience seeme to have demonstrated the fact that the only way to subdue the Apaches is to have sufficient force to attack them where they live, destroy their crops, keep their families moving, and to deprive them of any safe place in which to keep their plunder; by doing this they could not spare men from home to make raids and in a short time would become sufficiently starved to oblige them to sue for peace." Letter to Major General Thomas, commander of Military Division of the Pacific, dated August 31, 1869, in Tucson, Arizonian, September 25, 1869.

[23] Report of Ord, in Secretary of War, Report, 1869, 121-126.

[24] Ibid., 124.

reduction of these hostiles in Arizona,[25] of whom he wrote:

> These Arabs of Arizona have heretofore neither given nor asked quarter; their hands have always been bloody, their favorite pursuit killing and plundering, their favorite ornaments the finger and toe nails, the teeth, hair, and small bones of their victims.

He went on th point out that since miners and settlers were the prey of these Indians, the Apaches must be captured and rooted out unrelenting vigor. He stated that since his previous report some two hundred had been killed, and villages burned, and, as a result, some bands had sued for peace, a portion of the Coyoteros, under Miguel, among them. Because of the willingness to acquiesce to the demands of the Government on the part of some of these, he regretted the extermination policy;[26] however, he stated:

> Of course the extermination policy is resolved upon only when every other means fail to protect our people; and if it is possible to induce the Apaches to accept terms, it should be done.

This had been the first formal proposition for surrender from that section. General Thomas C. Devin, commander in southern Arizona, was instructed to send Colonel Green, with sufficient forces, into the White Mountain country to report on the suitability of the location and probable expense of establishing a post in that vicinity.[27] Because of murders, tortures, and cruel treatment of members of their families, some whites regarded all Indians as vermin, to be killed when met, whether friendly or not; thus reservations were

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[25] Report of Ord, in Secretary of War, Report, 1869, 121.

[26] Ibid., 122.

[27] Ibid., 123.

necessary for the Indians themselves. General Ord also recommended the use of native scouts and commended their success in tracking the hostiles to their mountain refuges.

During this period there was a growth of feeling within the Territory concerning the manner in which the Apache should be handled. Washington had no definite effective policy; reservations were set aside and the Indians invited to go upon them, but they did as they pleased, and depredations continued. The people of Arizona saw the necessity for a definite policy which would strike at the hostiles in such a manner that they would be forced to remain on the reservations and cease their destruction of human life and property. But still no action was taken by the Government, and the Apaches continued abroad.

Arizona was created a separate department in May, 1870, and Colonel George Stoneman sent to take command. His orders to the post commanders, Orders No. 7, dated at Drum Barracks, May 31, were as follows:[27]

> In their intercourse with Indians, the troops will treat as friendly those who are positively known to be such; the most vigorous and persistent efforts will be made to pursue and chastise those not so considered, and to this end both Cavalry and Infantry will be employed either separately or jointly, and in large or small parties as may be thought most advisable.

He made a thorough inspection, according to his own report,[29] and careful investigation within the limits of the

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[28] Tucson, Arizonian, July 9, 1870.

[29] Ibid., January 28, 1871. Dispatch to the New York World. This report was received too late to be included in the annual report of the Secretary of War.

Department as far as time and circumstances would allow. At the time he assumed command there were eighteen posts in the Department, three of which had been discontinued at the time of his report, December 27, 1870. Colonel Stoneman recommended the concentration of troops at eight posts and that the quartermasters' depots, except at Yuma, be broken up and civil employees discharged. These changes would aid in his efforts to reduce expenses and he felt would increase the efficiency of his command. The posts remaining would be Camps Verde, Thomas, and Grant, in the heart of the hostile Indians; Bowie, Hualapai, and Date Creek, in three of the greatest mail routes and highways through the Territory; and Mojave and Yuma, infantry posts on the Colorado River, having control over the river Indians. Colonel Stoneman considered these in the importance named.[30] Fort Whipple he felt had long since lost its usefulness and along with a number of other posts should be abolished to do away with unnecessary expense. As a result of successful operations of the troops from Camps Grant and McDowell against the Indians in June and July a large number had been killed, and the commanding officer reported the number of depredations since had been small. In speaking of the condition of Indian affairs in Arizona he said:[31]

> The all-absorbing topic in Arizona, the irrepressible Indian, is approached with no little reluctance,

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[30] "The posts and depots recommended to be discontinued are expensive, and can be dispensed with advantageously to the Government, and without other detriment than a pecuniary one to the people of the Territory in their immediate vicinity." Report of Stoneman, in Tucson, Arizonian, January 28, 1871.

[31] Ibid.

> fearing that the authorities at headquarters at San Francisco, as well as Washington, may have already become surfeited and wearied with its consideration. It will, however, be proper to state, that, since the organization of the Department, the Hualpais Apaches, Mojaves or Yavapais, and the Coyotero Apaches, have become quiet, and are fast becoming domesticated. Cachis, with his band, which, during the past eight years, has caused great trouble, has expressed a wish to go on a reservation, become quiet and be let alone.
>
> There now remain but two branches of the great Apache nation in Arizona, that are in open hostility, and measures are being taken to bring them to terms. These are the Tontos and Pinals. No treaties or promises have been made, except to assure them that as long as they behave themselves, they will not be neglected, but if they misbehave they will be pursued and punished.
>
> The Che-me-hue-hiros, and that portion of the Mojaves not on reservations, though well disposed toward the whites, are at war with each other. . . The Yumas and Pah Utes are also peaceable and well disposed. The Pimas and Maricopas, both semi-civilized tribes, and a fraction of the Mojaves, are on a reservation, under control of Indian agents; besides these above named there are a few stragglers, belonging to no particular tribe, who prowl about in small parties, stealing, as opportunity offers and necessity dictates. . . Indian, as well as other affairs in the Department are in as satisfactory a condition as can be reasonably expected.

It is interesting to note that although he belittled the recent depredations the editorial of the same issue of the Arizonian in which this report appeared called attention to the number of settlers and travelers slain since the spring of 1857.[32]

Governor Safford wrote from his office in Tucson, August 5, 1870, that he had been traveling among the Indians since April to see if there was any hope of anything con-

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[32] "We can go back over the files of this journal, and, since the Spring of 1867, find recorded the names of more than three hundred and fifty settlers and travellers who have fallen [illegible] without including some fifteen more who have fallen within the present month (and year.) Editorial, in Tucson, Arizonian, January 28, 1871.

cerning the Apaches except extermination. He found the Coyoteros, some sixteen hundred in number,[33] friendly disposed. The Apache-Mojaves, fifteen hundred to two thousand,[34] sent word to Camp Date Creek that they desired peace, and a portion of the tribe came in.[35]

Captain F. E. Grossman, United States special Indian agent for the Gila River reservation,[36] said in his report dated September 1, 1870, that the Pimas and Maricopas, always represented as friendly and peaceful, were stealing from herds, and going on fighting expeditions against the Apaches,[37] sometimes with the military and sometimes not. During the previous November about four hundred, principally Pimas, had left the reservation, moved into the fields of the Mexican settlers near Adamsville, gathered the corn and bean crop, and then turned their horses in to destroy the remainder. Captain Grossman had reported their conduct to the commanding officer, at Fort McDowell, but no action had been taken. Many Pimas remained outside

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[33] Safford to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1870, 600-601.

[34] Ibid., 601.

[35] "The Indian agency must be prepared to meet them halfway, as soon as they, the Indians, offer peace, and immediately prepare them to sustain themselves under the change of life. . . If they lay down their arms, and are willing to submit, we cannot ask them to starve. ." Ibid., 601.

[36] Report of Grossman, op. cit., 582-592.

[37] "They do not kill travelers and emigrants, like the Apaches, but the obliging, hospitable, and honest Pima of yore, who kindly assisted the Americans who passed through

the reservation at Blackwater, refusing to come in. Captain Grossman denied reports which he said were being made from time to time by the military to the effect that the settlers had encroached upon the lands at the agency, but he stated that the Indians had encroached upon lands of the settlers, and had even tried in one instance to collect some rents from some Mexicans for lands not belonging to the reservation. The water from the Gila was used irrigation, and as settlers farmed on the banks of the upper Gila and took water from the stream, the Indians found it increasingly difficult to obtain a living by farming;[38] hence they robbed the settlers, and, leaving the reservation, went over to the Salt River, there to annoy the settlers and in turn be robbed and killed; an unpleasant feeling had developed between the citizens and these tribes as a result. A survey had just been completed for an extension of the reservation; Lieutenant Colonel Andrews, superintendent of Indian affairs for Arizona in 1870, asked for speedy action in order to avoid trouble.

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his lands in those days, has disappeared, and now owners of cattle rarely ever pass this reservation without losing more or less stock." Report of Grossman, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1870, 589.

[38] "They now complain of being too closely crowded by the white settlements. . . and assert, with great show of truth, that the lands secured to them by a regular Spanish grant have been taken from them without their consent and without any compensation. . . agriculturalists and stock-raisers. . , the question should be definitely determined as to their reservation." Report of E. S. Parker, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1870, 472.

Superintendent Andrews saw the necessity for harsh measures toward the hostiles, and in his report expressed the policy which was later carried out by General Crook:[39]

> Rumors of treaties between the military and the Apache Mojaves, and other tribes in the northwestern portion of the Territory, have reached me; but I have yet to be convinced that any good results have ensued, or that they are considered binding by the Indians, only so far as suits their own convenience.
>
> An experience acquired by several years' intercourse with Indians . . . forces upon me the conclusion that there is but one effective mode of dealing with them, viz; having been subdued by force of arms, they must at once be disarmed and placed on reservations, and there forced to remain and compelled to work for their living by troops stationed on the reservations for that purpose. To accomplish so desirable an end there must be entire harmony of action between officers on Indian duty and those on military duty, and to secure this harmony of action all must be subject to one controlling power.

During August of 1870 the Arizonian recorded atrocity after atrocity, among them the murder of Thomas Venable. The following is a partial description of his mutilated body:[40]

> His eyes were torn out, his nose and lips cut away, and the skin and flesh were torn from one side of his face and hung in shreds upon his neck.

This is not an exception, unbelievable as it may seem. Many other accounts show the Apache as unfeeling at heart. Fair play or sportsmanship was unknown to him; he never attacked unless sure of an easy victory; he would stalk his prey for hours, if necessary, until the safe, opportune time for attack arrived. John C. Cremony wrote in

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[39] Report of Andrews, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1870, 579.

[40] Tucson, Arizonian, August 13, 1870.

regard to these Indians:[41]

> It matters not by what process or method of schooling the Apache has become the most treacherour, bloodthirsty, villianous and unmitigated rascal upon earth. . Kindness and generosity provoke his contempt and he regards them as weaknesses.
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> . . . . . .
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> What ever his sufferings, no complaint or murmur is ever heard to escape his lips, . . Ten Apaches will undertake a venture which will stagger the courage and nerve of a hundred Yumas, Pimos or Navajoes. . . The cunning of the Apache is only equaled by his skill and the audacity with which he executes his projects.

Matters had reached the point in August, 1870, where Governor Safford and the citizens of Tucson decided to act. Subscriptions were made sufficient to place a small company in the field. The Governor took command and part of the time acted in conjunction with Captain Miles and for a time with Lieutenant Cushing. This company of volunteers was in the field twenty-seven days, marching on foot somewhat over six hundred miles, the greater portion of the distance over rocky mountainous country.[42]

Perhaps the most despairing note sounded by the Arizonian through this trying period is found in the issue for February 4, 1871:

> The history of the past fifteen years fails to picture a time at which the prospects of the Territory appeared as gloomy as at present. At this time, when from every thicket and mountain pass along our public highways, the dreadful war-cry of the hostile savages apprizes the traveler that he is called upon to defend his life, the country is being divested of its protective force, protective stations are being abandoned, the few that are permitted to remain intact . . . are being weakened.
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> The valley of the Sonoita, which has heretofore been protected by Camp Crittenden, will be restored to

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[41] Cremony, Life among the Apaches, 320, 34.

[42] Kelly, Legislative History, 44.

> the Indians . . . already many of the settlers have left and others are preparing to follow.

It is clearly evident that Colonel Stoneman not only did not attempt to carry out a definite policy, but also that he did not enforce the orders issued to his troops in regard to the hostiles. Continued raids in the vicinity of Tucson led the prominent citizens to send a committee with a protest to the commanding officer; the committee was told that since troops were inadequate, Tucson should protect her own citizens.[43] A number of these depredations had been traced to the band on the Arivaipa near the post of Camp Grant, where they were receiving rations. A raid on the Wooster ranch near Tubac resulted in the Camp Grant massacre. Satisfied that these Indians were responsible, and acting on the suggestion of Colonel Stoneman, six Americans and forty-eight Mexicans from Tucson, with ninety-two Papagoes, surprised the sleeping Indians at dawn on the last day of April, 1871. The massacre was complete; the men fled to the mountains, but the women and children were slain. Lieutenant Royal E. Whitman, commander at Camp Grant, under whose protection these Indians had placed themselves as they had not wanted to go to the reservation set aside in the White Mountains, claimed them innocent of any wrong doing since they had been under his care; but in the trial which resulted all who took part in the massacre were exonerated by the Territorial court. Within a

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43 Charles T. Connell gives this statement as well as an account of the massacre from William Oury, one of the six Americans who took part.

few days after the Grant massacre word was received that the White Mountain Apaches near that post had broken out in open war and fled to the mountains. In spite of all efforts a general war with the Apaches seemed inevitable. There seemed to be no other course than to retrace the steps taken for the purpose of economy and place forces in Arizona upon an efficient footing. Colonel Stoneman was relieved, June 4, by Lieutenant Colonel George Crook, Twenty-third Infantry.[44] The citizens of Arizona had petitioned the President to send Crook,[45] but not until the Grant massacre, followed by the death in May of the brave and daring Lieutenant Cushing in the Whetstone Mountains at the hands of the Chiricahua Apaches, did President Grant heed their petition. As lieutenant colonel, Crook was not in order for the command of the Department, but because of the great necessity the President passed him over the heads of forty colonels and placed him in command, as the law permitted,[46] on his brevet rank of major general. Orders were given for the reenforcement of the troops to about original strength, and the new commander was given

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[44] Report of Major General Schofield, commanding the Military Division of the Pacific, in Secretary of War, Report, 1871, 67.

[45] Crook had been assigned to the district of Boise, Department of Columbia, in 1866; he had just completed the subjugation of the Snake tribe in Idaho, when he was transferred to Arizona.

[46] Captain Charles King, George Crook, pamphlet in the Munk library on Arizoniana, Southwest Museum.

necessary means and full authority[47]

> to prosecute such military measures as the emergency might render expedient.

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[47] Report of Major General Schofield, in Secretary of War, Report, 1871, 67.

Chapter II

GENERAL CROOK TAKES COMMAND

General Crook arrived in Tucson the morning of June 19,[1] went to the residence of the governor, and before sundown everay officer within the limits of the southern district of the Territory was under summons to report. The commander was taking over a new territory, and there was much knowledge that he needed to collect. He did not hesitate to ask questions; he gleaned information from all sources.[2] After having questioned the post commanders and scouts about the trails and other conditions, he started on his march to Camp Bowie, leaving Tucson, July 11, with five companies of cavalry and a company of scouts, white and red.[3]

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[1] "General Crook arrived here yesterday, and in less than an hour set about the work in hand. Escaped Mexican captives and friendly Indians have been interrogated, and others are sent for with the same purpose. The General is determined to get the most and best attainable information about the Apache, his numbers, trails, most frequent rendezvous, and move against the hostile ones with the minutest information of how to do it effectively. . . The general rightly believes that a sharp offensive war will soon bring about a lasting peace." Tucson, Citizen, June 20, 1871.

[2] "From each he soon extracted all he knew about the country, the lines of travel, the trails across the various mountains, the fords where any were required for the streams, the nature of the soil, especially its products, such as grasses, character of the climate, the condition of the pack-mules and all pertaining to them, and every other item of interest a commander could possibly want to have determined." John G. Bourke, On the Border with Crook, 108-109.

[3] E. L. Sabin, General Crook and the Fighting Apaches, 71.

Crook stated as the purpose of this first march an alliance with friendly Indians at Camp Apache, after operations against Cochise.[4] The march itself was intended primarily as a practice march in which the men and officers could become acquainted and become familiar with the country.[5] The line of travel was due east one hundred and ten miles to old Fort Bowie, north through the mountains to Camp Apache, thence across the unmapped country over and at the base of the great Mogollon range to Camp Verde and Prescott on the west, some six hundred and seventy-five miles in the presence of the tireless and ever vigilant enemy.

The great study of this march was the pack-train.[6] Crook was assigned to Arizona to subdue the Apaches; it was either a matter of bringing the Apaches under the

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[4] The expedition reached Apache on August 12, and while there news of the Indian situation in Arizona and New Mexico had been brought to light. A delegation reported to Crook that the Indian agents in New Mexico had paid runners out to gather Cochise's band. The leader said that he had received $1,000 for taking one hundred and fifty old men, women, and children of this band to the reservation at Cañada Alamosa. This was given as the reason that Crook had found their homes deserted, for with the old in New Mexico, the warriors were on the war-path. Thus the Indian Bureau, unintentionally, was aiding them and hindering the efforts of the military. Tucson, Citizen, August 24, 1871.

[5] Bourke, On the Border with Crook, 137.

[6] "Orders have gone out to recruit every horse and mule and have all packing gear in perfect order for use at an hour's notice. No thought of a cessation of hostilities is entertained. The troops and everybody have confidence that the country will be thoroughly scouted the coming Winter. If no adverse War Department Orders intervene to change the general programme, Arizona will have peace that can be trusted." Tucson, Citizen, August 24, 1871.

control of the Government or evacuation of the whites. Depredations and murders must cease if the white settlers were to remain in Arizona. To bring about the subjugation of the Apache, a thoroughly organized and well equipped pack-train and efficient system of transportation must be had; without this, an efficient army was impossible. What condition did Crook find to exist? In his report for 1871,[7] his first report after taking over the Department, he said that he found the transportation very limited and in bad condition, wagons falling to pieces by way of shrinkage from intense heat and from the climate, many mules unserviceable from want of care and lack of knowledge. He recommended that rolling stock be constructed at Yuma from seasoned material; and the saddles, which were unsatisfactory, he recommended in the future to be made in Los Angeles from seasoned material.[8] Bourke[9] goes more into detail in this matter, and from him, who was well qualified to speak on the subject, we are able to see the thorough manner in which the new commander went about to improve conditions which must be remedied if he succeed. He saw as soon as he entered Arizona his task and lost no time in setting about it. He made the study of the pack-mules and packing one of the outstanding studies, although not the only one by far, of the first march. Those who were with Crook on this first march found that he had

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[7] Report of Crook, in Secretary of War, Report, 1871, 77-78.

[8] Ibid., 77.

[9] Lieutenant Bourke was in Arizona previous to the command of Crook for two years and soon after Crook's arrival was

studied this science,[10]

> and, applying the principles of military discipline to the organization of trains, made them as nearly perfect as they ever have been or can be in our army history. . .
>
> He made the study of packtrains the great study of his life, and had always the satisfaction of knowing that the trains in the department under his control were in such admirable condition, that the moment trouble was threatened in other sections, his pack-trains were selected as being best suited for the most arduous work.

There seemed to have been no special attempt previous to his coming to systemize or better transportation facilities. The system of pack-transportation that he found had been brought up from Chile, Peru, and the western states of Mexico for the immediate needs of the mining communities on the Pacific coast. These concerns were mere money making concerns, the men as well as the animals employed only as temporary makeshifts and discharged as soon as the emergency ceased to exist. He persuaded the Government to purchase three complete pack-trains from their civilian owners who had been hiring them out to the Government, and these three trains he brought to Arizona with his.[11] Crook's idea was to select the trains under the pack masters with the widest experience and by nature best adapted. He chose his animals with as great care as he selected his men, and the oversized animals as well as the undersized Sonora "rats" were sold or transferred to

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[10] Bourke, On the Border with Crook, 138-139, 150.

[11] Sabin, General Crook and the Fighting Apaches, 92.

another use, and their places were filled with others of a type which had been proved most appropriate.

Not only were the men and animals carefully selected, but the commander saw the necessity of the proper sort of equipment, without which his services would have been seriously handicapped. Each mule was provided with an "aparejo"[12] made especially for him, for it was necessary that the mule carry the burden without injury to the back and shoulders. All material used in these trains had to be of the best, for, once on the march, it would be impossible to replace anyhting broken, and the failure of supplies to arrive might be rather disasterous.

Bourke goes on the say that Crook knew what was done to every mule and had the satisfaction of seeing his trains carrying a net average of three hundred and twenty pounds to the mule, while the Government had issued a pamphlet stating that the highest average should not exceed one hundred and seventy-five.[13] Not a day passed that he did not spend from one to two hours in personal inspection of his trains, for he felt the great responsibility of having these in perfect order.[14]

In speaking of the further knowledge obtained Bourke

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[12] Pack-cushions.

[13] Bourke, On the Border with Crook, 158.

[14] "Every pack train in our army today has grown from a nucleus arranged by General Crook . . . it is the statement of a fact known to all in that command in Arizona that Crook knew every packer by name, and what his peculiarities were and how he cared for his animals, and besides

said:[15]

> Last, but not least, we learned the country -- the general direction of the rivers, mountains, passes, where was to be found the best grazing, where the most fuel, where the securest shelter . . . Nothing was too insignificant to be noted, nothing too trivial to be treasured up in our memories; such was the lesson taught during our moments of conversation with General Crook.

At Camp Apache -- the two branches of the Sierra Blanca unite almost in front of the camp -- General Crook found a large number of Apaches under chiefs peaceably disposed toward the whites. Colonel John Green, First Cavalry, with two troops of his own regiment and two companies of the Twenty-third Infantry, was in command. Here General Crook had several interviews with Miguel, one of the friendly chiefs. He talked to the Indians simply, telling them that he had not come to make war but to avoid it, that since the white people were crowding into Arizona, soon it would be better to plant grain and to raise horses, cattle, and sheep, and make their living in that way; so long as the Apache behaved, he would receive the protection of the troops, but if some kept on the war-path, he could not promise full protection; he did not intend to punish anyone for the past, and no matter who was responsible for the beginning of the war, it must end; he intended to deal with all the tribes in the same manner, and he urged the Indians to aid in spreading these views among

knew every mule in his outfit." Bourke, "General Crook in the Apache Country," Century Magazine, March, 1891.

[15] Bourke, On the Border with Crook, 139.

the other bands out in the mountains; and, if after a reasonable time they did not come, he intended to start out in person to see to it that the last man returned to the reservation or died in the mountains.[16] The Indians learned to accept the word of the new commander, for he never failed to carry out his promises as well as his threats; they found in him an understanding and sympathetic friend.[17]

When he left Apache, the command had been reduced by the departure of three companies in as many directions.[18] The march was now nearly due west, along the rim of the Mogollon mountain, or plateau; on one side the soldiers could look down into the Tonto Basin, a basin only in the sense that it is lower than the ranges enclosing it -- the Mogollon, Mazatzal, and Sierra Ancha; the whole triangular area is cut up by ravines, arroyos, and small stream beds, and hills of some height; and as it was unmapped, the soldiers were wholly dependent upon the Apache guides. As they approached the western extremity of the plateau, they

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16 Bourke, On the Border with Crook, 143.

17 "There never was an officer in our military service so completely in accord with all the ideas, views, and opinions of the savages whom he had to fight or control as was General Crook." Ibid., 112.

18 "A Department Order, dated August 14th, Camp Apache, constitutes the troops of Captain Moore and Stanwood, Third Cavalry, a command to operate against hostile Indians independent of posts . . . An expedition commanded by Captain Guy V. Henry, troop D, is now scouring the country between Camps Apache and McDowell." Tucson, Citizen, August 24, 1871.

entered the country occupied by the Tonto Apaches, the fiercest band of the Apache nation; here they struck due north to the head of Fossil Creek Canyon, into Clear Creek Canyon, until they reached Beaver Creek, whose vertical walls were followed until the wagon road from the Little Colorado to Camp Verde was reached.[19] From the valley of the Verde to Prescott the march was somewhat over fifty-five miles. When the soldiers reached Fort Whipple, within a mile of Prescott, their march of six hundred and seventy-five miles was ended.

The soldiers no longer had the detachment of scouts with whom they had left Tucson, for General Crook had discharged them at Camp Apache when he had received word from Washington to cease operations against the Apaches until the Government peace commissioner should treat with them in an attempt to bring about peace; nor were the five Apaches who had acted as guides to the center of the Mogollon with them.

This march was preparation for the campaigns which were to follow; unmapped territory as it was made the knowledge obtained in this first-hand manner essential if the commanding officer really intended to pursue and bring the Indians in upon the reservations, as he had promised to do. One of the outstanding characteristics of the man was the thoroughness with which he attacked his new assign-

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[19] Bourke, On the Border with Crook, 157.

ment. Bourke, who was nearer to him than any other during these days, continually bore witness to the thorough manner in which all details of any importance whatsoever dealing with the natives or the country were collected. Some of these details were seemingly so minor and unessential that anyone with less insight into the problem or less determination to see it accomplished would not have taken the time to study them.[20]

The first act of the commander after reaching Fort Whipple was to move departmental headquarters from Drum Barracks;[21] his next duty was to perfect the knowledge already gained of this enormous area; this necessitated an incredible amount of traveling on mule back over mountain trails. General Crook did this himself, tedious as it was, in order to save his officers and have them in readiness and untired by the strain of this travel when it should be necessary for them to take the field. He visited the reservations and became acquainted with the chiefs on whom he could depend when the struggle came.

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[20] "Crook learned, while on that march, the name of every plant, animal, and mineral passed near the trail, as well as the use to which the natives put them, each and all; likewise the habits of the birds, reptiles, and animals, and the course and general character of all the streams, little or big. The Indians evinced an awe of him from the first moment of their meeting; they did not seem to understand how it was that a white man could so quickly absorb all that they had to teach." Bourke, On the Border with Crook, 152.

[21] Drum Barracks was located within one mile of Wilmington, California.

After visiting the northern portion of the Department, General Crook turned his attention to the matter of supplies. Everything used in the Territory came from San Francisco at a great expense to the Government. When he assumed command in June, 1871, all supplies were hauled across the Colorado Desert by either of two routes; one, from Los Angeles to Fort Mojave, two hundred and eighty-five miles; the other, from San Diego to Fort Yuma, two hundred miles. Since July 1 the Colorado Transportation Company had been transporting supplies and troops direct from San Francisco, by water, to Forts Yuma and Mojave;[22] this was done with more dispatch and economy, and the supplies came through in better condition. Most of the supplies were distributed from post to post by pack-trains; the contractors hauling freight remonstrated, but Crook, realizing the necessity of keeping the trains at the highest efficiency, saw the advantage of keeping them constantly moving from post to post carrying supplies.

General Crook considered the posts on the Colorado River well selected for operations against the hostiles, as they were on the border of hostile country; all reservations he found in heathful locations with the exceptions of Grant and Verde; he abandoned Camp Pinal on account of its inaccessibility. The troops from Drum Barracks and San Diego he ordered moved in order to concentrate and utilize their transportation.

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[22] Report of Crook, in Secretary of War, Report, 1871, 77.

After having been in the Apache country from June 19 until September 28, the date of his report, General Crook said of the Apaches:[23]

> I think the Apache is painted in darker colors than he really deserves, and that his villianies arise more from a misconception of facts than from his being worse than other Indians. Living in a country the natural products of which will not support him, he has either to cultivate the soil or steal, and, as our vacillating policy satisfies him we are afraid of him, he chooses the latter, also as requiring less labour and being more congenial to his natural instincts. I am satisfied that a sharp, active campaign against him would not only make him one of the best Indians in the country, but it would also save millions of dollars to the Treasury, and the lives of many innocent whites and Indians.

Crook considered the services of the Apache scouts invaluable; he spoke highly of them and recommended their use. The great difficulty in operating against the Apache was the inaccessibility and extent of the country. These native scouts, singly or in bands of two, three, or more, would scatter far and wide in advance and on the flanks of the troops. If a trail or any other indication of hostiles was discovered, report was sent back; the advance was made during the night and the telling blow struck at dawn before the hostiles could know that the troops were near.

As yet Crook had not begun his real work; we have seen that Bourke spoke of this as a practice march for the purpose of learning the country, becoming acquainted with conditions, and becoming acquainted with the men and officers. Had the march given the commanding officer the necessary

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[23] Report of Crook, in Secretary of War, Report, 1871, 78.

information? No doubt it had, for he had formulated a plan, which he would have put into operation immediately, if Washington had not ordered otherwise. We have his own statement:[24]

> My intention was to put in the field at once five expeditions constructed similarly to the one commanded by Captain Henry; but as I was just completing the last of these organizations, I learned that the settlement with the Indians had virtually been taken out of my hands, and turned over to the peace commissioners. I at once ordered the suspension of hostilities, for fear of interfearing with their plans. Cochise's band has been particularly active in its depredations lately, and I think this is mainly due to the fact he is left footloose, while his families are being subsisted and protected on the Indian reserve at Cañada Alamosa, New Mexico.

Brigadier-General Pope, commander of the Department of Missouri, said that the Apaches had not improved in conduct or character during the year; he went further to say that most of the hostile acts of the Indians had been committed in Arizona and New Mexico, and he had proposed beginning some scouts against them, but the arrival of Colyer, charged with the experiment of making peace with them, made it proper to suspend hostilities.[25]

In this manner we find the work of General Crook for the year 1871 ended, or rather called to a halt by the appointment of a peace commissioner seeking to bring about the same result as Crook but in a different manner. In referring to the work of Crook during 1871, Schofield,

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[24] Report of Crook, in Secretary of War, Report, 1871, 73.

[25] New Mexico was in the Department of Missouri.

commander of the Military Division of the Pacific, wrote:[26]

> The vigorous measures promptly adopted by Crook were sufficient to deter the large majority of the Indians from engaging in the war, while the efforts of the Indian commissioner and the officers of the Army to convince the Indians of the good faith and humane purpose of the Government seem to have been fully successful.

General Schofield felt that if hopes could be realized, troops might be reduced at some time in the future; but experience had shown that the presence of troops was necessary to protect the Indians upon the reservations from their white neighbors, as well as to protect the whites, as long as there were hostiles at large. Although the cost for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1871, for the Department was less than the annual cost for many years, General Schofield saw that the Indians must be subdued or the troops withdrawn, occupation otherwise would be too expensive. Crook considered the force then sufficient to subdue the Indians, if kept well mounted and fully equipped with the means for active operations. The lack of telegraphic communication with headquarters and principal stations in Arizona was a source of embarrassment, expense, and delay.

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[26] Report of Schofield, in Secretary of War, Report, 1871, 67.

Chapter III

VINCENT COLYER, PEACE COMMISSIONER

Crook's campaign, then, was called to an end before it had really begun; although he had been sent to Arizona to bring about peace, matters were taken out of his hands before he had been given the opportunity to accomplish his purpose. Perhaps the reason is a little difficult to understand, but it must be kept in mind that Arizona and the Apaches, with their atrocities, were in the West, while the Government was in the East, miles in distance and days and weeks in communication. Much time passed before reports reached the East; time and distance lent a hazy, uncertain reality to such reports. Also it must be taken into consideration that there were reports of a two-fold nature; not only were there Apache atrocities, but also there were reports reports of murders and thefts in retaliation. As there are always two sides to every issue, there are also sympathizers for each of these sides. There were those who sincerely believed that the Apaches were mistreated and saw in them objects of pity, who needed only kindness, food, and education to make them law-abiding citizens; they felt that peace could be brought about without the aid of the military or bloodshed, by sending commissioners to offer peace and reservations with the inducements of rations and other supplies. Two different Departments

were acting in regard to the situation in Arizona, the Department of War and the Department of the Interior. General Crook was acting under the Secretary of War when he was asked to delay hostilities until Vincent Colyer, sent out by Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior, could attempt to bring about a more satisfactory agreement with the Indians. Crook was to be permitted to protect the property of the citizens when it was necessary, and punish marauders, but he was to delay open hostilities and to cooperate in every possible way with the peace commissioner.

In order to see the accomplishments of General Crook in their true light it is necessary to cover the visits of the peace commissioners; for Colyer was followed by General O. O. Howard, and their work covered the period of a year, from the autumn of 1871 until the autumn of 1872, during which time General Crook was restrained from taking the field.

In the autumn of 1871 the Secretary of the Interior, C. Delano, considered that the peaceful policy of the Government of the past two years had been producing gratifying results, that the board of commissioners authorized by the law of April 10, 1869, had done much toward civilizing the Indians and aiding in establishing the new policy, and that a better understanding of the designs of the Government, on the part of the Indians, had resulted, with the exception of the roving bands in New Mexico, Arizona, and western Texas. These had not been reached by the new policy, and

concerning those in Arizona he said:[1]

> It was represented to the Department during the past summer that Cochise, the Apache Chief, was at last willing to cease his depredations, and would use his influence with his people to bring them upon a reservation, if they could be protected in going to such a reservation, or while remaining thereon. To afford him an opportunity to manifest his good faith in making such offers, Hon. Vincent Colyer, Secretary of the board of Indian commissioners, was directed to visit the Territory of Arizona, and to offer Cochise the protection of the Government, while he should endeavor to bring his people upon a reservation.

Colyer's original directions from the President, through Townsend, Adjutant General, were to collect the hostile Indians of New Mexico and Arizona upon a reservation at Cañada Alamosa, and any Indians which might be induced to come in, both on the way and after his arrival at the reservation.[2] July 27, he wired for an enlargement of his powers and received his request.[3] Upon receipt of the telegram Mr. Colyer, who was then at Lawrence, Kansas, en route, immediately selected Camp Grant, Arizona Territory, as a reservation on the west, where the Apaches would be fed and protected. Lieutenant Whitman was retained in charge and runners were sent out to notify peaceably disposed Apaches to come in.[4] The expense of this and other reservations were to be met by the $70,000 appropriation made by Congress for that

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[1] Report of C. Delano, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1871, 9-10.

[2] Instructions of Townsend to Colyer, op. cit., 461.

[3] "The Secretary of War directs that the order of 18th instant, for the protection of Indians at Canada Alamosa, be extended to include such other reservations as Mr. Colyer may select." Ibid., 461.

[4] Ibid., 462.

purpose by an act of March 3, 1871.[5]

Upon arriving at Camp Apache, Arizona, Colyer was well received by Colonel Green; and here he learned that General Crook was on his way to Prescott and that his campaign for the time was at an end, so that there was no danger of Colyer's orders crossing the movements of the commanding officer. Feeling the necessity of a reservation in this section, Colyer set aside Camp Apache as such. Following the massacre at Camp Grant, the Apaches on the White Mountain reservation, nearly all, some six hundred, under the leadership of Es-cet-e-cela, had fled to the mountains, killing a herder on the eve of their departure. Miguel's band remained, and when it was demanded of him that he arrest the murderer, he had sent out and had one of Es-cet-e-cela's band killed. Through the efforts of Colyer, Es-cet-e-cela and Miguel were reconciled and told that all past offences were forgiven, and clothing and gifts were distributed. General Crook had enlisted some twenty-five of Miguel's band as scouts, but on the evening of Colyer's arrival, four couriers arrived from General Crook, at Camp Verde, with orders to discontinue the enlistment of Indians. Colyer welcomed this news as a change of policy; however, Crook did this only as an effort toward delaying actual hostilities until Colyer should finish his mission.

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[5] Report of Colyer, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1871, 460.

On arriving at Camp Grant the thirteenth of September, the commissioner learned of the approach of an armed band of some two hundred citizens from Tucson, who intended passing through the reservation; at the request of Colyer, Captain Nelson, commander of the post, issued an order forbidding this band to approach nearer than ten miles of the post.[6] This act was deemed necessary to keep the Indians on the reserve. General Crook reprimanded Captain Nelson for this action, since his order would virtually forbid the passage of any person from Tucson to Florence on the public highway; the road went within four miles of Camp Grant, and all travelers were compelled to go armed because of existing conditions. Since two chiefs of the Arivaipa and Pinal Apaches clung to the Arivaipa and San Pedro valleys as their home, not wanting to move to the White Mountains, the reservation at Camp Grant was declared.[7]

At the Gila River agency the chiefs were called together and told that they must cease their attacks on the Apaches, only going against them if asked to by an army officer through their agent; they were told to cease their raids on the settlers on the Salt River. These chiefs blamed certain of the young men for the trouble, and said that the whole tribe should not be punished because of them, and even Mr. Colyer expressed the need of discipline in this matter. The Apaches had complained

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[6] Report of Colyer, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1871, 468.

[7] Ibid., 472.

bitterly of the Pimas and Papagoes for waging constant warfare against them.

From the Gila River, Colyer went to McDowell to open communication with the Tonto Apaches. Here the white flag was set up, runners were sent out and every effort made to bring the Indians in, especially Del-che. Colyer left before any results were realized, but after his departure the Tontos came in slowly until some two hundred, representing four different bands, were in; frightened, however, in some unknown manner, they suddenly left. It was later reported that the Pimas and Maricopas, hearing that the warriors were at McDowell, had gone to Reno and killed thirty-two defenseless women and children of the Tontos.[8]

The Apache-Mojaves at Camp Verde asked for a reservation and agreed to receive the Apache-Mojaves scattered over the middle and western portion of Arizona, who met at Date Creek, if they would come in with them; however, they refused to go to Date Creek themselves, being afraid of the settlers nearby. Within seven weeks some five hundred and eighty Apache-Mojaves were drawing rations.

It is interesting to witness the meeting of the peace commissioner and General Crook through the report of the commissioner:[9]

> We arrived here on the evening of the 4th, and were received quite cordially by General Crook. . . Indeed, throughout my journey in Arizona and New Mex-

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[8] Report of Colyer, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1871, 480.

[9] Ibid., 482.

> ico, I have been received with the utmost kindness by the officers of the Army, as I have before reported.
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> The General and I differed somewhat in opinion as to the best policy to be pursued toward the Apaches, but as these differences were honestly entertained and kindly expressed, it did not lessen the cordiality of our intercourse; and as he desired me to frankly express my opinion if there was anything in his official action which I questioned, and as he had been pleased to do the same with me, much to my satisfaction I told him I could not help expressing my regrets that he should have felt it to be his duty to censure Major Wm. Nelson for his manly defense of the Indians upon the reservation at Camp Grant.

As both General Crook and Colyer thought it not advisable to move the Date Creek Indians that winter, the post, and an area of one mile around it, was made a temporary feeding station by order of General Crook. A temporary reservation was also declared for the Hualapais at Beale Springs, a military post, about two hundred miles to the northwest of Prescott.[10] Although he had not succeeded in locating Cochise, his chief reason for being sent to Arizona, he left Prescott for San Francisco on October 7.[11] These were his own words concerning his arrival:

> General Schofield was glad to see me. The many exaggerated reports in the newspapers of the 'cross-purposes between General Crook and the peace commissioner,' had made himdesirous to learn the truth. When he ascertained that instead of placing the Indians on the reservations which I had selected, 'under the care of the proper officers of the Indian Department,' as I had been directed to do in my instructions from the Secretary of the Interior, I had availed myself of the clause which allowed me 'full power to use my best discretion,' and I had left the whole business under the supervision of General Crook and the officers of the Army.

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[10] Report of Colyer, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1871, 482.

[11] Ibid., 484.

His last report,[12] dated December 20, 1871, gave the following Indians on reservations; Camp Apache, 1,500; Camp Grant, 900; Camp Verde, 500; Camp McDowell, 100. No reports had been received of those at the temporary feeding stations at Camps Hualapai, or Beale Springs, and Date Creek, possibly 1,000 more; without counting these Mr. Colyer estimated more than half of all the roving Apaches within call of the Government and at peace.

The Citizen, in the issue for November 4, quoted the San Francisco Bulletin, of October 21:

> At last accounts, General Crook had suspended hostile operations in order to give the Peace Commissioners full swing; but we are reliably informed that the General, in view of the fact that the Apaches have warred upon the Mexicans for more than a hundred years, upon our own people in Arizona ever since they began to occupy it, and have repeatedly violated pledges of peace and friendship, thinks they can hardly be expected to keep faith now . . . he really regards them as treacherous savages, with whom a lasting peace can only be made by conquest of arms, which he had prepared for, and was confident, until Colyer's arrival, he could speedily effect.

During Colyer's stay Crook had been active, by mule and buckboard, over roads and trails of northern Arizona, learning them as he had learned the trails of the south; usually he had with him Bourke and a cook, or packer, as he wished his officers in readiness for scouting expeditions. Pack-train outfits were kept in perfect condition, for he expected a hard campaign as soon as Colyer departed.

It is true that the commissioner had been well received by the Indians and that they had been friendly, had

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[12] Report of Colyer, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1871, 434.

accepted the rations he had distributed, and promised to cease unfriendly acts; but these promises meant little. Cattle were carried off, mail-trains destroyed, homes and farms raided, and men killed, as though there had been no peace commissioner recently in Arizona.

Without any more waste of time, matters were taken out of Colyer's hands, and, for the time at least, General Schofield was placed in control, and General Crook was given instructions to proceed.[13] The time for half-way measures had passed. The order from Washington practically changed headquarters for the management of the Apaches from Washington to San Francisco. General Orders to Crook from Headquarters of the Division of the Pacific, dated November 23, 1871,[14] provided that all Indians found off the reservations after the time fixed by the Department Commander were to be treated as hostiles, and that any Indian leaving a reservation for any reason whatever without written permission was to be treated as having left for a hostile purpose. No citizens were to be allowed on the reservations, and when it should be necessary for any to cross a reservation, they were to be escorted by troops

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[13] "General Schofield will be placed in control of the Indians of Arizona, and will be instructed to bring them upon the reservations and keep them there. They will be fully protected in all their rights while on the reservations. If they leave to go on the war-path they will be punished." Dispatch from Washington, November 9, in Tucson, Citizen, November 18, 1871.

[14] General Orders, in Tucson, Citizen, December 2, 1871.

to prevent a collision. Each Indian was to be registered and provided with a full personal description which he must carry with him at all times. General Schofield left it within the discretion of Crook to make use of native scouts to hunt those who remained obstinately hostile, and he conferred full authority to adopt any measures necessary to carry out his instructions and make effective the policy of the Government.

The people of the Territory were encouraged in the belief that their troubles were soon to be at an end under the able command of General Crook, and the Citizen pledged their hearty support to the military forces in the following:[15]

> Our confidence is cheerfully strengthened in this respect, by the significant fact that General Crook is left undisturbed in command of this Department. He possesses the entire confidence of General Schofield, and will unquestionably come to an agreement of details, which they will enforce, and which we believe the citizens generally will endorse and aid in an honest application.

In a letter from R. C. McCormick, dated November 16, 1871, to Governor Safford, we read:[16]

> Under the new orders, Superintendent Bendell[17] is required to locate in Prescott and to follow General Crook's headquarters . . . for the purpose of securing harmony of action between the Indian Bureau and the War Department . . . .

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[15] Tucson, Citizen, November 18, 1871.

[16] McCormick, delegate in Congress, to Safford, in Tucson, Citizen, December 23, 1871.

[17] H. Bendell had succeeded George Andrews as superintendent in Arizona in 1871.

General Sherman [in a letter] to General Schofield . . . asks that officer to assure General Crook, that if the Apaches, after being duly notified by him to go upon reservations and remain there, do not do so but continue their hostilities, he will be 'warmly supported' by the War Department in rigorous, aggressive operations against them . . . I hope, however, that the people of the Territory, although their patience has been much tried, will in no way interfere with a fair trial of the new reservation experiment.

Chapter IV

THE MISSION OF O. O. HOWARD

Executive Order, November 9, 1871,[1] set aside the reservations recommended by Vincent Colyer, required that the Indians remain on them, and cease their roving habits. From newspaper reports of the period we find that the mission of Colyer and the Executive Order had made little impression on the Apaches. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs said in his report[2] that the efforts made to place the hostile Apaches on reservations had not resulted very successfully; for although the Indians came in in great numbers,[3] they left at will whenever disposed, renewing depredations before Government rations were exhausted.

There were two policies[4] of the Indian Bureau in regard to the Indians of Arizona and New Mexico: one regulating the treatment of tribes potentially hostile -- the

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[1] Report of Commissioner of Indian Affairs, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1872, 446.

[2] Ibid., 391-493.

[3] "Not one solitary Apache, male or female -- of the many hundreds who, agreeable to the Cilyer policy, have recently been fed at Camp Verde -- is now to be found upon the reservation, all having decamped early on the morning of the 14th inst., after having burned their camp. On their way to the mountains they passed through and rifled the haycamp of C. C. Bean, of provisions, etc." Excerpt from Prescott, Arizona Miner, February 24, in Tucson, Citizen, March 2, 1872.

[4] Report of Commissioner of Indian Affairs, op. cit., 391-392.

Apaches, whose hostility was only suppressed just so long as supported in idleness by the Government; the other regulating the treatment of those which, from traditional friendship, numerical weakness, or by force of location, were either indisposed toward, or incapable of resistance -- the Papagoes. These two divergent policies were subject to much criticism, but they were, the commissioner thought:[5]

> Compatible with the highest expediency of the situation.

The system pursued in dealing with the roving bands required the use of the military in restraining and punishing refractory individuals, but this did not constitute an abandonment of the peace policy, as it was not war but discipline. The roving bands which were off the reservations but were not giving any trouble were left alone as a means of economy; but others, the Tontos in particular, gave little encouragement for further forbearance.

A second attempt to bring about peace without the use of force was made in 1872, when the Secretary of the Interior sent General O. O. Howard, during April and May, with instructions[6] to study conditions and make recommendations, to act in harmony with General Crook, to take such action as he thought best to preserve peace with the Indians, and to impress the military authorities that both whites and Indians must conform to the wishes of the Government. Sec-

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[5] Report of Commissioner of Indian Affairs, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1872, 392.

[6] Report of Howard, op. cit., 533-534.

retary Delano wrote Howard concerning his appointment:[7]

> Circumstances have recently arisen creating apprehensions that hostilities may be renewed between the Indians and the military authorities, whereby the policy thus inaugurated [by Colyer] is in danger of being defeated.
>
> To prevent, if possible, the occurence of such a result . . . you are hereby authorized and requested to proceed to the Territories of Arizona and New Mexico. .

President Grant wrote General Schofield in March[8] that the sending of the peace commissioner was not intended to interfere with the military, that, if the Indians would not accept the necessary restraints, force should be used. On the same date E. D. Townsend, Adjutant General, wrote the following to Schofield:[9]

> While, therefore, he [Secretary of War] is entirely in accord with yourself and General Crook, in your plans and views, he assents to the policy of sending General Howard with full powers from the Department of the Interior to make a determined renewed effort to influence the Indians for their own good and that of the country . . . It is expected he will give more deliberate attention to the matter and act more immediately in concert with General Crook than any agents who have heretofore visited Arizona.

En route to Prescott from the Gila River agency, General Howard heard reports of fresh attacks by parties of Indians upon travelers and ranches; so he was not surprised to learn from General Crook that citizens were calling on him for protection from different quarters. He was convinced by the official reports of Lieutenant Michler and Captain Mason that Crook must be relieved of any restraint

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[7] Instructions of Delano to Howard, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1872, 544.

[8] President Grant to Howard, op. cit., 545.

[9] Townsend to Howard, op. cit., 545.

imposed by his own coming; consequently, he sent a letter to the commanding officer, May 9, 1872, in which he said the purpose of the telegram[10] which had been sent on April 21 was to prevent hostilities as far as possible, until he could make an effort toward peace;[11] however, the robberies and murders must cease, and since his efforts were not succeeding, in the name of the Secretary of the Interior, who had given him discretionary power, he would relieve General Crook from anything in the above mentioned telegram that would hinder a vigorous course.

Herein, I believe we see the difference between Mr. Colyer and General Howard -- although it is not within our purpose to criticize or evaluate the work of either: Mr. Col-

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[10] Crook was about to make an attack on the hostiles in their mountain homes that would have given peace to much of Yavapai and Mojave counties, when the telegram to prevent collision between the troops and Indians found its way to him in the mountains. Tucson, Citizen, September 21, 1872.

[11] ". . . to prevent collision as far as possible between the troops and the Indians, was to enable the Secretary of the Interior to make one more effort to settle all trouble peaceably . . . That effort has been made through me as the special commissioner. As robberies and murders still continue among the incorrigibly hostile, those who are not on reservations, and who will not go on reservations, there is no course left but to deal with them with vigor, according to your discretion, until the murderers and robbers, and those who sympathize with them, whatever tribe they belong to, be made to feel the power of the Government to punish crimes. I will, in the name of the Secretary of the Interior, who sent me here with discretionary power, and in accordance with the spirit of the President's orders, relieve you from anything in said telegram that shall hinder this vigorous course." Howard to Crook, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1872, 553.

yer shut his eyes to the fact that as soon as his back was turned as he went from one tribe to another, and hence to California and Washington, the Indians paid no regard to promises and went ahead as they had done before he arrived; while General Howard, able to see that his efforts were not bearing fruit, immediately relieved Crook of any restraint and thus gave him power to control the situation.[12] Colyer sensed antagonism wherever he went, refusing to address the people of the Territory; Howard addressed the people of Prescott, who he said seemed to feel that the Indians must be subdued before they would be content to remain on reservations, but they were willing to give the peaceful plan a trial; of the commanding officer, General Howard said:[13]

> General Crook, who was present at the meeting, remarked that 'the effort to civilize and elevate Indians on reservations by labor in agriculture, and by schools for the young, as set forth by Agent Smith and myself, were in entire accord with his observations and convictions.'

This we know to be true, for Crook spent much time studying climatic conditions and the industries of the Indians that he might better guide them. Throughout his report General Howard spoke of the complete cooperation of General Crook, and at no time did he in any way criticize the actions or attitude of Crook.

That General Crook was willing and anxious to cooperate

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[12] Although Howard relieved Crook in this manner, the campaign which was to be put the Indians on the reservations could not go forward as long as Howard was in the Territory.

[13] Report of Howard, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1872, 539.

is shown in the circular letter which immediately followed General Howard's letter and which went from his office to the commanding officers throughout the Territory.[14] Following his letter to Crook, General Howard notified Secretary Delano of his action and pointed out the necessity for it, saying that immediate action would in the end hasten the reservation plan.[15]

At the crossing of the San Pedro at Camp Grant, Howard, accompanied by Crook and Superintendent Bendall, was met by many Americans and Mexicans from Tucson, nineteen Papagoes, forty Pimas, and many Apaches. Howard noticed attempts to disturb friendly relations between himself and Crook, but the frankness with which Crook met the situation prevented

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14 "In view of active operations being resumed against incorrigibly hostile Indians, the department commander wishes to impress upon the minds of all the earnest desire of the Government to retain upon the reservations set apart for them all the Indians that are now or may hereafter be allowed upon them, under the restrictions and orders heretofore issued. To this end, officers will aid the duly authorized agents of the Government, by every means in their power, in their efforts to civilize and elevate the Indians under their charge or that may come under temporary charge of the officers of the Army.

"Indians who desire to avail themselves of the privileges allowed under the provisions of General Orders No. 9, current series, from these headquarters and surrender as prisoners of war, should be fully advised that the close surveillance and guard to which they will be subjected is for their own protection, and that, as soon as the tribes to which they belong resume friendly relations with the Government, so that they are no longer in danger of being killed as accessory to those who are still committing acts of hostility, they will be allowed the same privileges as those whose friendly relations are more fully established, and be protected therein." Circular letter issued from Crook's headquarters, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1872, 555-556.

15 Report of Howard, op. cit., 554.

any misunderstanding.[16] Formal peace was here made between the Apaches and those with whom they were at war -- the Papagoes, Pimas, Americans, and Mexicans; they also pledged themselves to help General Crook find those who were incorrigible; all those present took the same obligation, which was universally agreed to later at the White Mountain reservation. Other tribes sent in to see if they might be received, and Howard believed that if this were followed up by the superintendent, all would soon be on reservations; but he felt that the efforts of Bendell should follow, rather than precede, the actions of General Crook against those actively hostile.[17]

Mr. E. C. Jacobs, agent for the Camp Grant Indians, requested the removal of the reservation because of the unhealthful location and difficulty in obtaining supplies; Howard officially abolished the reservation, and by making an addition to the White Mountain reservation he created the San Carlos division.[18] The agent was notified that, as Crook advanced against the Indians and they came in upon the reservation, they should be immediately reported to the

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[16] Report of Howard, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1872, 540.

[17] "I do not recommend any cessation of hostilities on the part of General Crook toward those maraudering-parties who are infesting the country, but that, with a sufficient escort, the superintendent go to the Indians near Reno and communicate with them . . . If General Crook makes a successful raid against any of the bad, then is the time to be on hand to fix terms of permanent peace." Ibid., 540.

[18] Ibid., 556.

post commander for his orders in the case.[19] At Camp Apache,[20] General Howard completed the delegation of Indians chosen to return to Washington with him, and leaving Arizona he started for New Mexico on June 1.

General Howard made several recommendations and asked that certain of his actions in the Territory be confirmed. Most important, however, was his request in regard to Crook. There had been some criticism because of Crook's use of friendly Indians in seeking out the hostiles; Howard recommended that this practice be continued. He also recommended that the commanding general be unrestrained to use his own discretion; concerning this recommendation, he said:[21]

> No one can do anything well, bound hand and foot by a multitude of specific orders, that may or may not apply to the situation. Knowing the eagerness of this administration for peace, General Crook will, if trusted with it, precede and follow all his active operations with judicious efforts to establish peace and save the effusion of blood. The great majority of the officers now in Arizona have good habits, are ready for duty, and heartily endorse the President's peace plan. .

This Howard had written after he had been through the Per-

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19 Report of Howard, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1872, 557.

20 "The visit of this delegation resulted from the missions of General Howard to that Territory [Arizona] in April and May of this year. The delegation consisted of two Pimas, one Papago, one Yuma, and four Apaches. The representative character of these Indians, or their influence with the tribes to which they belonged, was not in all cases very well assured; but General Howard is confident that their visit resulted in good. . ." Report of Commissioner of Indian Affairs, op. cit., 485-486.

21 Report of Howard, op. cit., 542.

ritory, seen the Indians, and conferred with them and with General Crook and his officers. When he had first met Crook at McDowell he had been favorably impressed and at that time he had written to Secretary Delano[22] and to General Schofield[23] concerning his good faith and willingness to cooperate; and to President Grant, he had written:[24]

> After a satisfactory interview with General Crook. . . I am fully satisfied that Crook has no other desire than to carry out your views, as expressed in the letter I have from you to General Schofield.
>
> He is industrious, asks for no more force, believes in punishing the guilty, but is far from being sanguinary in his purposes and practices. I would ask for no better officer to work with me in carrying out what I understand to be your Indian policy.

Howard felt that peace could be accomplished by the superintendent's working with the commanding officer, but without checking operations against raiders.[25] The super-

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[22] "Yet the case of Arizona is not so hopeless as I feared. General Crook and his officers seem prompt to supply information, to send escorts through dangerous country, and to help in every possible way to bring to pass what you desire." Howard to Delano, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1872, 550.

[23] "I find General Crook very candid and evidently desirous to execute the orders he receives with discretion and fidelity." Howard to Schofield, op. cit., 550.

[24] Howard to President Grant, op. cit., 549.

[25] "The relationship between the superintendent and the commanding general is a peculiar one. When there are hostile tribes to deal with, both cannot be in absolute authority. In Arizona I did not see any want of co-operation, and I merely call attention to the relationship, that it may be so settled that each may understand his responsibility." Report of Howard, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1872, 543.

intendent himself had no criticism to offer of General Crook, of whom he wrote:[26]

> Shortly after my return from San Francisco. . . I received peremptory instructions to remove my office at once to the headquarters of General Crook, commanding the Department of Arizona. . .
>
> The policy of the Government as inaugurated was the subject of frequent consultation between General Crook and myself. Our views were in accord, and nothing has occurred from that time until the present to disturb the harmony of either official or personal relations. I deem it not inappropriate to offer my thanks to that courteous officer for the frank expression of his views on all occasions, and for the prompt and kind manner in which he has responded to all my requests.

General Howard returned in November on a second visit to complete his mission. At Camp Grant matters had not proceeded according to his expectations or those of the officials at Washington; the Indians had not been moved to the San Carlos as Howard had recommended; there was continual sickness and drinking, and some of the Indians had been fired upon by the guard;[27] and some had left the reservation. Lieutenant Jacobs had been removed as a result, and George H. Stevens, highly recommended by the officials at Camp Apache, had taken his place; General Howard asked for a complete investigation.[28]

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[26] Report of Bendell, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1872, 695.

[27] "An attempt was made at the military post of Camp Grant to arrest an outlawed Indian by the name of Co-Chinay . . . The Indians, running when the soldiers approached them, were fired upon -- three shots -- none of which took effect." Report of Jacobs, op. cit., 711.

[28] Report of Howard, op. cit., 560.

Howard's work had been concerned with what was known as Grant's peace policy, which had not been accepted by the hostiles in Arizona and New Mexico. Colyer had not been able to locate Cochise, and Howard was then appointed[29] to make another effort, but it was not until his second trip to the Territory that he succeeded. He determined to seek the Chiricahua chieftain in his stronghold in the Dragoon Mountains. Captain Jonathan Jeffords, the only white man to have visited the stronghold and lived, acted as his guide. They went without a military escort, and Cochise was very much impressed with the sincerity of Howard, who waited eleven days until the captains of the Chiricahuas could be brought together. Since his people were scattered and he did not want them restrained in coming and going as they chose, he was opposed to the reservation plan; but he finally gave his consent on the condition that Jeffords be their sole agent. General Howard made peace on these terms, and the Chiricahua reservation, situated in the southeast corner of the Territory, was set apart, with headquarters temporarily at Sulphur Springs.[30]

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[29] "One object in choosing me was that I was known as a friend of the Indians, and another that I had sufficient rank as a major general to command everybody in the military service in the department and districts of the Southwest." Howard, My Life and Experiences among our Hostile Indians, 120.

[30] The conditions of this peace which the Government had tried to bring about by sending both commissioners made it impossible for the military to have any control over the actions of these Indians, and as a result, the peace in the end was a disadvantage rather than an advantage.

General Howard, by an order which was to go into effect January 1, 1873, abolished a portion of the White Mountain reservation; and McDowell, Date Creek, and Beale Springs were abolished as reservations or feeding stations, as General Howard judged it better for the Indians to have fewer reservations.[31] The Apache-Mojaves were to choose between the Colorado and Verde reservations as soon as they should make peace; the Tontos, between the White Mountain and Verde.[32]

General Howard recommended the reduction of the Department by transferring Camps Apache and Bowie to the District of New Mexico, relieving the Arizona troops stationed at these posts by troops from New Mexico, and the transfer of the White Mountain and Chiricahua reservations to the New Mexico superintendency. This reduction of the Department of Arizona would enable General Crook to place four or five companies in the vicinity of Florence and Tucson.[33] Concerning General Crook, Howard reported:

> At last accounts he was operating in the north against the Mojave Apaches . . . He will probably next pass into the Tonto Basin and conquer the Tonto Apaches. Then he will be prepared to proceed against the depredating Indians southeast of Tucson.

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[31] Report of Howard, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1872, 560.

[32] Ibid., 560.

[33] Ibid., 561.

Chapter V

CROOK'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS FOR 1872

General Crook was by no means idle during the year in which he did not aggressively go into the field against the hostiles. As we have seen from the reports of both Colyer and Howard, he was ready at all times to cooperate with the peace commissioners. He gave his time, and he gave escorts when called upon; but he was not merely passive during this period. When he took over the Department, he did not find conditions very satisfying; he found inefficiency everywhere.[1] We turn to his report for September 21, 1872, in order to see the results of his reorganization. He called attention to the fact that when his previous annual report was made he was *en route* for his headquarters in Prescott, where the officials of his staff with their clerks and records arrived on October 2. Temporary shelters were erected, and attention was directed to correcting the many abuses in existence. Boards of survey were instituted, inspections by competent officers ordered, and general closing of unsettled business inaugurated.[2]

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[1] Report of Crook, in Secretary of War, *Report*, 1872, 72-80.

[2] "And the past year has been one in which the administrative departments have been put in admirable working order; and with the improvements still going on in this direction, under the efficient chiefs of the respective departments on duty at these headquarters, it is hoped that

Crook described the public quarters for the troops as not fit for animals. The fund for this purpose was small, but by judicious use of it and careful consolidation of small into large posts a vast improvement was made.[3] Nor had the sick been neglected. Certain portions of the Territory were infested with malaria, as well as other disorders. With the improvements in living quarters, conditions were made more healthful, and the personal attention of a medical officer of high rank and experience made the daily improvement in the care of the sick possible. In the stations of men suffering from local malaria, the chronic cases were changed to Fort Whipple and there placed under the care of Surgeon E. I. Bailey, medical director of the Department, and some men who had been termed incurable had been saved to the service.

Nearly all supplies for the Department were had from San Francisco; thus at times they were late, and due to the fact that the supplies of the troops had to be distributed among the Indians, whose promised supplies had not arrived, purchases had often to be made in the Territory at very high prices. The chief commissary of the Depart-

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in the future Arizona, instead of being a place where all the irregularities known to the service exist, will present as fair a record for economic and efficient administration as can be found elsewhere in the army." Report of Crook, in Secretary of War, Report, 1872, 73.

[3] "And when the two posts under orders for establishment in the southern part of the Territory, one near Tucson and one on the Arivaipa, near Grant, to take the place of four now occupied, the troops in the Department will be as comfortable as temporary barracks can make them." Ibid., 74

ment had no control over the supplies until they reached the Yuma depot, Arizona City. The lack of proper storehouses was the cause of serious losses due to exposure and to theft; the issues were often made under the supervision of non-commissioned officers or irresponsible parties. To remedy the existing condition Crook issued General Orders No. 5:[4]

> Providing for secure store-rooms and cellars, store-rooms to be without fires, to be unoccupied by clerks and enlisted men, constantly under sentry, and never opened except in the presence of an officer, preferably the officer responsible for the stores, by whom all issues were to be superintended in person.
>
> The store-rooms either have been or are being provided as rapidly as possible . .. to great advantage to the service and saving to the Government.

Major Evans, Third Cavalry, had been in charge for eight months and had discharged his duties satisfactorily.

Previous to the coming of Crook, pay-masters assigned to duty in Arizona were stationed in San Francisco. This had necessitated drains upon the quartermaster's department for animals, wagons, forage, and upon troops for escort. At the time Crook's report was sent in, a change was being made by which a pay-master was to be stationed at both Tucson and Prescott, making payments regularly at a great saving to the Government. At the time a request of Crook's for a designated depository at Prescott was before the Secretary of War and the Paymaster General.

General Crook felt that too often public property was

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[4] Report of Crook, in Secretary of War, Report, 1872, 75.

condemned and disposed of without due regard to economy and the interests of the public service, and as a result, he issued General Orders No. 20, series of 1871,[5] which forbad these inspections, except by specially appointed inspectors, with the exceptions of diseased horses and perishable stores, rapidly deteriorating. This, increasing the burden upon the division inspector, necessitated the appointment of a department inspector, for which the War Department gave authority.

Ever since Crook's arrival he had been handicapped by the lack of communication facilities; the nearest telegraph office was located at Los Angeles, and it took seven days at best to reach Los Angeles, by letter. Crook felt it necessary for the work before him and requested in 1872, as he had previously, telegraphic communication with all important points in the Territory. Major General Schofield also saw the necessity for this and called attention to it when he transmitted Crook's report to the War Department.[6]

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[5] Report of Crook, in Secretary of War, Report, 1872, 77.

[6] Letter of Schofield to Secretary of War, op. cit., 72. General Sherman indorsed the statement of Schofield, and by this showed his knowledge of conditions. The following, dated October 31, 1872, is taken from the Tucson, Citizen, January 18, 1873: "I agree with General Schofield that a condition of war has existed and does exist in Arizona, and if General Crook, as department commander, is to be held accountable, he should be supplied more liberally with all the authority and power of the War Department to bring this condition of things to a permanent conclusion. To this end, there should be telegraphic communication opened, as far at least as Prescott . . ." Secretary of war Belknap on December 12 had transmitted to the Senate and House of Represent-

Other defects existed in the accounting system; these were overcome by a system which required proceedings to be approved by the commander of the Department, previous to being used as sub-vouchers to accounts; before, these proceedings had been approved by the officer commanding the post and often they were returned by the accounting officials at Washington for correction, months later, when the data could not be obtained, as officials in Arizona had in the meantime been transferred to other fields.

The reduction of troops during the command of Stoneman for the sake of economy had resulted disasterously for the Territory, so when Crook assumed command the original quota of troops was restored. In the autumn of 1872 Crook asked that this organization of troops be filled to the maximum allowed by law. There had been some changes during the year.[7] The Fifth Cavalry from Missouri had been substituted for the Third in Arizona; the Twenty-first Infantry, having served the usual time in Arizona, was transferred to Columbia, being replaced by the Twenty-third of that Department; one company of the Twelfth Infantry was relieved from service in Arizona by another of the same regiment, and another similar transfer was to be made at an early date, since the better health of the troops required a change every two to four years. There were also changes in

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atives copies of papers showing the need for telegraphic communication between the military stations in this Territory.

[7] Report of Crook, in Secretary of War, Report, 1872, 65.

the Indian Bureau, which took place in 1873.[8] In 1871 Dr. Bendell had succeeded George L. Andrews, who had held office as Superintendent of Indian Affairs in 1869 and 1870; in 1873 the office was abolished, making it necessary for the agents to report directly to the commissioners in Washington, except when the need arose and special inspectors were sent out to the various posts.

During the fifteen months of his command, Crook had been called upon to provide guards and escorts to surveying parties, government officials, citizens passing from post to post, and even guards for homes distant from military posts. These escorts could not always be provided; but when they were, they generally were sent in wagons for the saving of cavalry horses.

At the close of Crook's report he gave a long list of depredations covering the year from September, 1871, to September, 1872, some fifty-four in all. In a summing up, or recapitulation,[9] of these we find the following:

> Officers: killed, one. Enlisted men: killed, two. Citizens: killed, forty-one; wounded, sixteen. Cattle stolen: property of government, sixty-eight; property of citizens, four hundred eighty-nine.

It is significant to note that the Legislature of

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[8] Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 544. Bancroft gives the date as 1872, but Congress did not pass the measure abolishing the superintendencies until the following spring, and the Tucson, Citizen, May 3, 1873, gives a report of Bendell, so he was in office at that time. His superintendency was abolished before the autumn of 1873, for there is no report from him in the annual report of the Secretary of the Interior for that year.

[9] Report of Crook, in Secretary of War, Report, 1872, 80.

California was sufficiently aroused by the state of affairs to pass joint resolutions[10] relating to the situation in Arizona. A statement of existing conditions was made and faith in General Crook and his ability to cope with the situation expressed. The resolution is of such significance that I quote at length:

> That for the murder of the fewest number of its citizens, who have been slain by these savages in Arizona, in any two months of the last two years, the United States would have declared war against every power in Europe had its citizens been so murdered there for want of proper protection from European powers; that the feeling and belief is universal on the part of the people of this State, and, we believe, of the Pacific slope, that when General Crook was sent to Arizona, he was the right man in the right place; that he is as humane as energetic, and that if allowed sufficient means, and given the discretion to which his experience in the management of Indian affairs entitles him, and not interfered with in his operations, he will in a brief period, arrest this reign of terror and blood, and give security to the long suffering people of this Territory . . .
>
> Resolved; That in no other way can this protection be so promptly and efficiently extended . . . as by furnishing General Crook with ample means, and by giving him the largest discretion in the course to be pursued toward the savages.
>
> Resolved; That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, urged and implored to prevent further interference with the military operations of General Crook, otherwise than by aiding his designs, until these savages are subdued and the people of Arizona are made secure in their lives, homes, and property.

General Crook had been in command since June, 1871; he had been sent to bring the Apaches under subjugation in order that it might be safe for American citizens to inhabit Arizona. He had not accomplished his purpose, for twice he had been interrupted and asked to delay hostilities, so that

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[10] No. 161, in House Miscellaneous Documents, No. 111-200, 1871-1872.

peace commissioners might attempt to bring about harmony. We have seen the results of these commissions. Schofield considered that time for delay had passed, and as he sent the report of General Crook to the War Department, he expressed the following opinion:[11]

> I think it must now be evident that forbearance toward the Apaches of Arizona has reached its extreme limit, and that no course is left us but a vigorous and unremitting prosecution of the war they have so long invited, until they are completely subdued. I recommend that General Crook be given ample means and full authority to deal with the difficult problem . .
>
> The department commander should have full authority to prevent such abuse [use of reservations for refuge by marauding Indians] and, for this purpose, to impose all necessary restrictions upon the Indians on reservations.

Crook, who was in the field and saw conditions more clearly than anyone else, could restrain himself no longer regarding his inability to act, so he wrote:[12]

> Although authority from various sources has been given for the chastisement of hostile Indians, in order to cooperate efficiently with the different agents sent to make peace with them, the operations having in view such chastisement have necessarily been confined to pursuit and punishment of parties actually engaged in massacres of citizens or depredating upon their stock. .

The pursuit of these marauding bands often led through irregular, deep-cut canyons and over lava beds, where the Indians, constantly on the look-out for pursuit, left no trace for the soldiers to follow. The Indians on the reservations, although often they were peaceful themselves, gave protection to the hostiles, either aiding them or refusing to betray

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[11] Report of Schofield, in Secretary of War, Report, 1872, 72.

[12] Report of Crook, op. cit., 73.

them. General Crook considered that the commissioners had been given fair opportunity to bring about peace, that he had done all that could be expected of him to aid them, that they had not accomplished the desired end, and he was anxious to proceed with the campaign. The following paragraph expressed his views at the close of 1872:[13]

> Having in view the great and earnest desire of the Government to find a peaceful solution of this problem, I have earnestly and honestly supported the agents . . . and the long and bloody list of murders and robberies committed during the year by the very Indians who, at one time or another, have been fed at the public expense, is a ghastly commentary upon the result . . . I have fully carried out that portion of my instructions. . . and I believe that humanity demands that I should now proceed to carry out the remainder of my instructions, which require me to punish the incorrigibly hostile. In doing this I shall ask and expect from the civil agents in the Indian Department that hearty cooperation in the future which I have not failed to extend to them in the past.

The officers of his staff consisted of Captain A. H. Nickerson, Twenty-third Infantry, aide-de-camp and acting assistant adjutant-general; Second Lieutenant W. C. Ross, Twenty-third Infantry, aide-de-camp and field quartermaster; Second Lieutenant J. G. Bourke, aide-de-camp and field adjutant.

Although there could be no offensive while either Colyer or Howard remained, the sign of fear that Crook was the man who would master them was shown in an attempt to assassinate him at Date Creek by the Apache-Mojaves in September, 1872. This was indirectly the outcome of the effort to punish those responsible for the Loring massacre[14] in the pre-

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[13] Report of Crook, in Secretary of War, Report, 1872, 79.

[14] This was the culmination of a series of raids and mas-

vious year. Crook was satisfied that the Yavapais at Date Creek were responsible for the deed, but in punishing the criminals, he did not want to harm innocent Indians at the agency. For the vital success of the reservation plan and the welfare of the peaceful Indians, it was necessary to demonstrate to them that those who received food and protection at the time that they also murdered and pillaged could and would be punished. Crook was criticized because he did not immediately take the field after Howard no longer restrained him; but he saw the futility of a campaign before he demonstrated to the Indians that none but sincerely peaceful Indians could find safety by flight to the reservations; otherwise, as soon as he took the field, the Apaches would flee before the troops to the reserves and nothing permanent would be accomplished. The Citizen expressed the belief that Crook should be given control of the Indians on the reservations, as well as those who were not, in order to settle the difficulties which arose from divided control.[15] During the months which followed the massacre he was busy determining the individuals responsible. Some of them were influential men of their tribe, and before long they began

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sacres perpetrated by the Yavapais in the vicinity of Wickenburg and Camp Date Creek. Loring, a young scientist, with a stage load of passengers, was brutally murdered here in November, 1871; only two of the party escaped, badly wounded. This is also known as the Wickenburg massacre.

15 "Let the reservation system be solely entrusted to Gen. Crook, and it will soon be made respectable and as advantageous to citizens as Indians . . . Our belief that General Crook is the best adapted officer in and out of the Army to manage Indians in their transition from war to peace, has for years been fixed and verified by his works . . . Let

to suspect that General Crook was planning to punish them. Through the Hualapais, Crook learned that on his next visit to the agency at Date Creek he was to be murdered during a seemingly peaceful conference. After the act the Indians were going to the inaccessible cliffs at the head of the Santa Maria fork of the Bill Williams. The death of Captain Philip Dwyer, commander of the post, made it necessary for Crook to be at the post before the entire band had succeeded in getting together; this and the fact that Crook was prepared defeated the conspiracy. The Indians implicated who escaped went to the appointed rendezvous, where word was sent to them by members of their band to come in, but they refused. A column of the Fifth Cavalry under Captain Julius Mason, with the aid of Hualapai scouts, located the fugitives at Muchos Cañones, on September 25, killing some forty of them.[16]

On October 12 General Howard concluded peace with Cochise and his followers, setting aside the Chiricahua reservation for them; the chief purpose for which he had come to Arizona was accomplished. General Crook was now free to go ahead with his plans; he set November 15, 1872, as the beginning of extermination or unconditional surrender.

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him have unrestricted control of the Indians on the reserves while operating against those off, and ere long his success will be manifest and satisfactory to all just and reasonable people." Tucson, Citizen, November 9, 1872.

16 General Crook, Report, 1873, MS, 8-9.

Chapter VI

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1872 AND 1873

About the time that the attempt was made on General Crook's life, orders were to received to drive the Apaches on the reservations and to keep them there. Crook set the middle of November as the date for the beginning of the campaign,[1] since that date would mark the beginning of winter and make the retreat of the Indians to the higher altitudes difficult because of the lack of clothing; also, fires would be necessary at this time of the year, and smoke would make detection by the troops much easier.

General Crook made a hurried march from Fort Whipple on the date set by the way of Camp Verde and Camp Apache, by trail about two hundred and fifty miles. At Camp Apache was begun the work of getting the scouts together. From Camp Apache to Camp Grant, a distance of more than a hundred miles, the command followed a trail of great steepness, filled with loose stones, which rolled under the feet of the soldiers and made their marching difficult.

At Grant the preparation began in earnest; within a few days the troops at the post were ready to move out under the command of Major Brown, Fifth Cavalry. All arrangements were completed by December 9, and word was given for the columns to converge upon the Tonto Basin.[2] The general plan

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[1] The description of this campaign is taken from Bourke, On the Border with Crook, 176-214.

[2] Bourke, "General Crook in the Indian Country," Century

was to make a thorough sweep of the Tonto Basin, the successful retreat of the Tontos and Apache-Mojaves, by a number of converging columns.[3] Of these columns Bourke wrote;

> Each able to look out for itself, each provided with a force of Indian scouts, each followed by a pack train with all needful supplies, and each led by officers physically able to go almost anywhere.

If the center of the Basin should be reached without any decisive action, the various commands were to turn back and search the country thoroughly so that no possible retreat should be left unexplored. In order to carry out this campaign, it was necessary to strip the posts of every available man and officer, leaving them unprotected, but by closely pursuing the enemy, little opportunity would be left him to raid; and at no time would the various commands be far from helping distance if necessary. The different commands crossed and recrossed each other's trails, always within supporting distance; thus the Apaches were unable to reassemble in the rear of any column, as had been their custom previously, for they had to keep watch on all points of the compass. General Crook took up headquarters at Camp Grant, but he moved from point to point, exercising complete supervision, but leaving the movements from each post under the control of officers selected for the work.[4] Crook gave

Magazine, XLI (March, 1891), 655.

[3] Bourke, On the Border with Crook, 181.

[4] Major George M. Randall, Twenty-third Infantry, operating from Camp Apache; Major George F. Price, Fifth Cavalry, Date Creek; Major Alexander MacGregor, First Cavalry, Fort Whipple; Colonel Julius Mason, Fifth Cavalry, Camp Hualapai; Captain James Burns, Fifth Cavalry, Camp McDowell; Colonel C. C. C. Carr, First Cavalry, Camp Verde; Major

instructions to the scouts and soldiers at Camp Grant as he had given at the other posts. The Indians were to be induced to surrender if possible, but if they did not do so, they were to be captured or killed; every Indian was to be placed on a reservation to avoid future bloodshed; women and childredn were to be spared when possible; prisoners were to be well treated; Indians were to be enlisted as scouts when they could be induced; no trail was to be left, and when the horse gave out the trails must be followed on foot; the campaign must be short, sharp, and decisive.

The story of one of these columns is given by Bourke, a story no doubt similar to that of the other columns. Bourke, with Lieutenant W. J. Ross, Twenty-third Infantry, was attached to the command of Major Brown, operating from Camp Grant, through the Mescal, Pinal, Superstition, and Mazatzal ranges, over to McDowell to receive further instructions. The soldiers of this command, consisting of two companies of the Fifth Cavalry and thirty Apache scouts, were experienced and inured to the climatic variations of Arizona. Captain Alfred Taylor and Lieutenant Almy were also with this command, and on Christmas day they were joined in the Superstition Mountains by Captain James Burns and Lieutenant Earl D. Thomas, Fifth Cavalry, with forty men of company G of that regiment and almost one hundred Pimas. In addition there were several guides and interpreters to take charge of the scouts.

William H. Brown, Fifth Cavalry, Camp Grant. Bourke, On the Border with Crook, 181-182.

Crook had been in constant communication with the Apache scouts and interpreters concerning his plans and the location of the hostiles; he hadarranged the details of the expedition before the column left the San Pedro. First, they were to locate Chuntz, who had recently murdered a Mexican boy in cold blood at Camp Grant; than the stronghold of Del-che, in the Mazatzal range, was to be destroyed.

The Apache scouts kept from twelve to twenty-four hours in advance of the main body; they were to trail the hostiles and locate them, but the soldiers were to do the fighting. The rancheria[5] of Chuntz was located and a full stock of winter food destroyed, but the Indians, who had received warning, escaped; although their trail was picked up and followed, only several were killed and three captured.

On Christmas day Captain Burns joined this column, and on the evening of the twenty-seventh they were told that the object for which they had come was almost attained. They were to be led by Nantaje, an Apache scout, who had been brought up in the cave of the Cañon of the Salt River, to that stronghold. All precaution was taken, else no one would escape alive. At the first appearance in the eastern horizon of a certain star the advance began, and before dawn the cave was reached. The following description shows the ruggedness of the region and the necessity for the caution of the Americans:[6]

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[5] A small settlement of huts.

[6] Bourke, On the Border with Crook, 191.

> The precipice forming that side of the cañon was hundreds of feet in height, but at a point some four or five hundred feet below, the crest had fallen back in a shelf upon which was a cave of no great depth. In front of the cave great blocks of stone furnished a natural rampart behind which the garrison could bid defiance to the assaults of almost any enemy.

Although the existence of a rancheria, or perhaps two, in this locality had been suspected, the whites had never located this stronghold.

The struggle which resulted was perhaps one of the most desperate to occur between the soldiers and the Apaches. Major Brown twice offered them the opportunity to surrender and twice asked them to allow their wives and children to come out, but he received yells of defiance and hatred in answer. After a last offer the death was heard within the cave, preparatory for a final charge. The scene was terrible, the death awful. Of the warriors only one old man was conscious when the soldiers entered the cave at noon; some seventy-six had been killed. A large in this vicinity took refuge on the summit of Turret Butte, considered second only to the Salt River Cave in impregnability, but, surprised here by Major Randall, they were completely wiped out, in less than a week after the battle in the Cave.[7] Major Brown marched his column to McDowell with the wounded and captives, where he was met by Captain Nickerson with further instructions; here the soldiers rested for several days before returning to Superstition, having been joined by other detachments.

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[7] Bourke, "General Crook in the Indian Country," Century Magazine, XLI (March, 1891), 660.

This march was a repetition of the first, with the same precaution. The troops worked carefully over the Superstition Mountains, as they had done the northern portion of the trip to McDowell, but with less success. On January fifteenth a small rancheria was entered, but the band escaped; however, later a representative was sent in, and, when he was told that the best thing for him to do would be to surrender before a scouting party should find his band and wipe it out, he promised to collect his people and meet the soldiers at the junction of the San Pedro and Gila and accompany them to Camp Grant. One by one the Indians joined the marching column, and when they reported to General Crook at the post, where he had returned from McDowell, there were one hundred and ten, twenty-six of whom Crook enlisted as scouts.

The twelve or thirteen companies of cavalry concentrated at the new camp of Camp Grant[8] were nearly all on the march to the Tonto Basin within a few days to give it another overhauling. The features of this campaign resembled those of the previous, but on account of the increasing cold on the higher elevations of the Sierra Anchas, Mazatzals, and Mogollons, where the hostiles had retreated for safety, was more unpleasant.[9] The disease known as epizootic had made its appearance in Arizona, crippling the resources in horses

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[8] This new Camp Grant was located at Mount Graham.

[9] "There was deeper snow and much more of it, more climbing and greater heights to attain, severer cold and more discomfort from being unable to find dry fuel." Bourke, On the Border with Crook, 208.

and mules; it was necessary to abandon the animals, and the rations were carried on the backs of the soldiers. The reward of their efforts was not far distant; the Indians were weakening.[10] In a number of instances, as in the battle of the Caves, Indians were surprised in the very act of plundering, and retribution swiftly followed.

While Major Brown's column was carrying out instructions, troops in other parts were also busy. The following is found in the Citizen for December 14, 1872, as information quoted from Prescott, December 6:

> The campaign against the hostile Apaches is being prosecuted with vigor . . .
>
> The troops in the northen part of the Territory are all on the move. Six separate commands left Verde, lately, having been let there by Captain Nickerson, Aide-de-Camp, with instructions. The troops from Date Creek and Wallapai[11] are all operating in conjunction with each other, and about one hundred warriors have been killed within the last two months.

This same issue of the Citizen reported that the Indians at Camp Grant had confidence in General Crook and had agreed to do whatever he asked; here he had enlisted forty scouts, all anxious for a fight with Del-che's band. Mention is made of the column out from that post with Major Brown; also mention is made of the party of troops out from Camp Apache with forty-seven scouts enlisted there. The Citizen went further to say:

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[10] "During the month of February the hostile bands infesting the country north of the Gila began to show signs of weakness; during March many surrender took place; about the first of April, they came in great numbers and begged for peace." General Crook, Report, 1873, MS, 11.

[11] Hualapai.

> He has got troops and Indians out from Verde, also, and with all the forces now at work, there is hope that, if Cochise remains quiet, the hostile Indians will soon be glad to beg for peace. The Indian agents are heartily cooperation, so far as we can learn, with the General, and if they are not interrupted, the movements now in operation will be continued till the force of large bodies will no longer be required in Arizona.

The command of eight soldiers and twenty Indians under Lieutenant Garvey mad an attack on a band of over one hundred Apaches under the command of Del-che, killing fourteen.[12]

The effects of this vigorous, concerted action throughout the Territory began to show results before long. During January, George H. Stevens, agent at Grant, reported favorably on the conduct of the Apaches at that agency; he considered that the operations of the troops had a wholesome effect upon the reservation Indians.[13] At Camp Date Creek some two hundred, under Chief Ochocama, came in for food and clothing and to save themselves from destruction; they reported to Colonel Nelson that they had recently lost fifty of their warriors to the troops and that further resistance was useless.[14] This was the first evidence of a desire for peace in this vicinity.

All along, ever since Crook had taken over the Department, the press had supported him, and with great eagerness his movements were watched and reported in its columns. The following paragraph is taken from the issue of February

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[12] Tucson, Citizen, December 28, 1872.

[13] Ibid., January 25, 1873.

[14] Ibid., February 1, 1873.

3, 1873:

> Gen. Crook arrived in Tucson yesterday afternoon. He has been in the field most of the time for several months -- latterly about Camp Grant and the new camp at Mount Graham. During the few months, he had uninterrupted sway, he has done more in the interests of peace than any and all officers who have preceded him in the war and peace business with Apaches.

He arrived in Prescott, February 17, just three months from the time he had taken the field.[15]

The gratitude throughout the Territory was so profound that it was expressed by the Seventh Legislature in a Memorial in honor of General Crook;[16] a portion of this follows:

> Whereas, under the system inaugurated by General Crook and in consequence of the vigorous measures adopted by him, we now for the first time since our organization as a Territorial government, enjoy comparative immunity from the attacks of our savage foes, therefore be it --
>
> Resolved: That we cordially endorse and approve the course of General Crook towards the Apaches; that we believe him to be eminently qualified to command the Department of Arizona during the existence of this savage warfare, and that if not again interfered with, he will bring our Indian war to an early and successful termination and secure a lasting peace with the Apaches.

Much to the surprise of the press and the people in the southern portion of Arizona, Cochise had kept faith with the peace made with General Howard; that is, the Chiricahuas did not murder and raid as they had previously, although they were constantly accused of stealing stock in the vicinity of their reservation. This peace had taken the control of the Chiricahuas from the War Department and placed them under the complete control of Captain Jefford,

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15 Tucson, Citizen, March 1, 1873.

16 Ibid., February 22, 1873.

their agent. Cochise did not consider that the treaty or the promise of good behavior in any way concerned his relationship with the Mexicans; consequently, the Chiricahuas satisfied their thirst for blood in raids south of the border. Among other prominent citizens to fall was Don Valencia, a member of the supreme court of Sonora. Governor Pesqueira of Sonora had written General Crook about the situation existing, but the commanding officer was powerless, by the treaty of Howard, to take any action. A letter to Governor Safford, dated March 14, a portion of which follows, sets forth the attitude of the Governor of Sonora:[17]

> I am much obliged to Gen. Crook and to your honor, for the pains you take in bringing our disagreeable position in which the privileges conceded to Cochise by Gen. Howard have placed us, to the knowledge of your government, and I hope that as soon as General Crook will have obtained permission to act according to his intentions, our calamities will greatly diminish.

During the first months of the year the various troops followed the pursuit of the hostiles, and these same savages who had witnessed many times the wavering policy on the part of the Government saw for the first time a policy carried out that meant either submission or death.[18] It did not

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17 Tucson, Citizen, April 5, 1873.

18 Lieutenant Michler en route from Verde to Mount Graham engaged the Tontos, January 23, at Tonto Creek, killing 17 warriors and capturing all supplies. Tucson, Citizen, March 1, 1873. Captain C. C. C. Carr and First Lieutenant Rice came upon a group of Apaches, killed six, and captured four squaws -- one of whom later escaped -- whom they took to Fort Whipple. Tucson, Citizen, March 29, 1873. Three men were killed on the Hassayampa, about ten miles below Wickenburg. The Tontos were probably responsible for the murder of these men while on their return from a sojourn

take them long to decide what to do.[19] The first week in April the representatives of hostile bands met at Camp Verde seeking peace;[20] they were told to return with the head chiefs to confer with General Crook. Signal fires were set on the hills to prevent further hostilities until it could be seen if the Indians were sincere.

On April 6, 1873,[21] the Apache-Mojave chief, Chalipun, and three hundred of his followers unconditionally surrendered to General Crook; these Indians represented two thousand three hundred hostiles. Chalipun, as representa-

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in the mountains between the Colorado and the Gila, where they had gone to avoid the troops at that time scouring the Tonto Basin; "but, if not interfered with, General Crook will ere long make the 'hide and seek' business very uncomfortable for the Apaches." Tucson, Citizen, March 22, 1873. The same paper of April 5, 1873, printed an excerpt from the Prescott, Miner, March 29, which recorded reports from the troops in the Tonto Basin of the killing of thirty-eight warriors and capture of seventeen squaws, in four different skirmishes. Some of the squaws said that their men had just returned from a raid in which three white men had been killed. The Tucson, Citizen, April 12, 1873, recorded that a group of the above Indians in trying to escape from the troops ran into Major Randall's command; forty-one warriors were killed and some twenty squaws and children captured and taken to Verde.

19 "The Indians are very much frightened and scattered, quite a number have come in at Camp Verde and surrendered, unconditionally . . . The commands are still operating in the field, and it is hoped that many surrenders will soon take place." Excerpt in Tucson, Citizen, April 5, 1873, from Prescott, Miner, March 29, 1873. "The Indians are flocking into Verde and seeking peace on any terms, and it is quite certain that if all do not ask peace soon, they will not have an opportunity to do so." Tucson, Citizen, April 12, 1873.

20 Bourke, On the Border with Crook, 211.

21 Ibid., 212.

tive of all the Apaches, spoke,[22] saying that since their own people were fighting against them they did not know what to do, even their mountain fastnesses were no longer safe for them. General Crook explained to him that the campaign had been necessary because the Indians had refused to obey his request to come in upon the reservations, and also that it would be necessary for them to wear identification tags as long as any bad Indians remained at large.[23] Taking into consideration the years of bloodshed and the inborn nature of the Apache to murder, pillage, and steal, it seemed to many that the peace was premature, that General Crook should have waited until the Apaches had been further defeated rather than declare peace when the first offer of submission came from them; however, this was a conditional peace, based upon the proposition that the Indians included -- that is, only those who surrendered and submitted unconditionally -- should cease their wanton habits. A portion of General Orders No. 12, announcing

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[22] Bourke, On the Border with Crook, 212-213.

[23] "While they did not disguise their hatred of the whites, they were abject in their plea for peace on the grounds that every rock had turned into a soldier, and that they even sprung from the ground . . . I endeavored to impress these Indians that while the government did not desire war, it was by no means anxious for peace: That if the Indians desired war, we were abundantly able to continue it, and the disadvantage would be their not ours. If the government made peace with them, it must not be for a week, a month or a year, but for all time; they must not allow the reservations they live upon to be made harboring places for bad Indians to operate from; in short, that they must submit to such regulations as the government wished to make, with a view to the prevention of such outrages, and they themselves must aid in carrying out these regulations and in detecting the perpetrators, when outrages were committed." General Crook, Report, 1873, MS, 11-12.

that peace, issued from Department Headquarters, April 7, 1873,[24] follows:

> The basis of this peace is simply that these Indians shall cease plundering and murdering, remain upon their several reservations, and comply with the regulations made by the government, through authorized agents, for them. . .
>
> After a sufficient time shall have elapsed to enable the friends of any renegades still at large to bring them in upon their proper reservations, post commanders will use the troops at their command to pursue or force them in, and in case any such straggling bands continue to remain absent without proper authority they will be forced to surrender or be destroyed.

General Crook was not only ready to establish peace at the first available moment, but, knowing human nature in general as well as the nature of these recently hostile bands, he knew that merely to place them upon reservations would be worse than useless. He knew that they must be watched over closely and measures must be taken to insure their good behavior through providing them with civil government. The following day he issued General Orders No. 15,[25] which constituted instructions to his officers in regard to bringing in the stragglers still at large and to serve as a basis for establishing civil governments at the various reservations. As a nucleus for this government, a small number of the natives used as scouts during hostile operations were to be retained in each of the reservations. They were to

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[24] Tucson, Citizen, April 19, 1873. Crook said concerning this peace: "After what I believed to be a full understanding I felt that I was justified in making peace with the tribes represented." General Crook, Report, 1873, MS, 12.

[25] Tucson, Citizen, April 19, 1873.

constitute a police force and to serve as such, but they were also to cultivate the soil as the other Indians were required to do. These police forces were to be under the command of officers designated by General Crook. The commanding officers at the posts were instructed to aid the Indian agents in establishing civil government in its simplest form and in instructing the Indians, so that they would be able to settle their own differences according to the usages of civilization, demonstrating to them its advantages over their own barbarous usages. General Crook called attention to the fact that all tribes could not be handled in the same manner and requested the agents to meet with the commanding officers on the various reservations and decide upon the necessary forms, and these forms were to be simple enough for the comprehension of the savages.[26] General Crook made every effort to secure permanently the results of the successful operations of the troops.

Confident ever since taking over the command of the Department that success would follow as soon as he could take the field unhampered, he now saw his accomplishment after having had the troops in the field less than five

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[26] ". . . leaving them forms of civil government to be enlarged with their capabilities, so that when the auxiliary force can be dispensed with, they will be capable of self government and enentually become better citizens . . . being careful to treat them as children in ignorance, not in innocence.

"Perfect harmony between the officers of the Indian and War Departments, on duty together, is absolutely necessary in treating Indians so lately hostile and so apparently incorrigible . . . "Tucson. Citizen, April 19, 1873.

months. Although no man of his command, whether officer or soldier, was more industrious, alert, or constantly in the saddle than he, for he kept in continuous contact with the various commands throughout the Territory, he unselfishly acknowledged the part each had played in bringing hostilities to an end. In General Orders No. 14 he complimented his officers and soldiers who had rendered service in the campaign; and because this order portrays so clearly the hardships of the campaigns, a portion of it follows:[27]

> In the face of obstacles heretofore considered insurmountable, encountering rigorous cold in the mountains, followed in quick succession by the intense heat and arid waste of the desert, not infrequently at dire extremities for want of water to quench their prolonged thirst, and when their animals were stricken by pestilence or the country became too rough to be traversed by them, they left them, and, carrying on their backs such meagre supplies as they might, they persistently followed on, and plunging unexpectedly into chosen positions in lava beds, caves and cañons, they have outwitted and beaten the wiliest of foes with slight loss, comparatively, to themselves, and finally closed an Indian war that has been waged since the days of Cortez.

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[27] Tucson, Citizen, April 26, 1875.

Chapter VII

FINISHING THE TASK

Peace with the great band of Apaches, concluded April 7, 1873, although it did mean comparative peace for the Territory, did not terminate all bloodshed.[1] The peace included only those who came in and surrendered; the military commands remained in the field, searching out these renegade bands, accepting their surrender if they surrendered, but in a number of instances killing the warriors and capturing the women and children. The Citizen has reports often of skirmishes between the Apaches and the troops during the remainder of 1873. The confidence of Washington in the results of the campaigns was expressed in the reduction of troops by the removal of five companies of the First Cavalry immediately following the peace of April.[2]

In the spring of 1873 the Modocs of Oregon and California went on the war-path, and Arizona feared that Crook would be sent there to quell the disturbance. General

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[1] General Crook wrote McCormick, April 11, thanking him for his able representation in Washington. He went on to say: "Although we may have some scattering depredations in some parts of the Territory, I feel that the main work is over, and the necessary corrections can be made by the post commanders. I expect, however, to be kept busy for several months to come, watching that the Indians on the various reservations settle down in the right grooves." Tucson, Citizen, May 24, 1873.

[2] Tucson, Citizen, May 17, 1873. General Crook, Report, 1873, MS, 1.

Schofield admitted that this would be a speedy solution but that it would be requiring too much of a man who had so recently finished such an arduous campaign.[3] The Citizen, however, expressed a different reason for not transferring Crook at this time:[4]

> We begged, pleaded and entreated the government to send him here, long before he was sent . . . It is well known to all who lived here at the time General Crook assumed command that the country was over-run with Apaches; . . there was no system, order or organization, and the Apaches were masters of the situation and did about as they pleased . . . no more troops could be spared to this department, and we replied that one man more was all that was required and that man was General George Crook. . . It is true that Gen. Crook has demoralized the Apaches. But why now have they accepted the situation? . . in Gen. Crook they have found a man of courage, will and energy, who adopts their style of warfare, who beats them on strategy and cannot be deceived by their cunning and misrepresentations.

Although it was too much to expect depredations to cease entirely, in July, Prescott had been free from such for several months.[5] But the northern portion of the Territory was not the only portion at peace; Tucson and the southern portion also were free from depredations.[6] Even though the campaign proper was over, General Crook did not cease his

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[3] Excerpt from San Francisco, Alta, in Tucson, Citizen, May 17, 1873.

[4] Tucson, Citizen, May 17, 1873.

[5] "This time last year, the Indians were murdering and robbing all around Prescott. But, it is several months since a depredation of any kind has been committed in this vicinity. So much for Crook." Excerpt from Prescott, Miner, in Tucson, Citizen, July 12, 1873.

[6] "Since that declaration [April 7, 1873], not one citizen has been killed or wounded by Apaches, and only one well authenticated case of stealing of citizen property in Arizona, viz: Some horses in the San Pedro settlements about May 15. The killing of Lt. Almy [at San Carlos, May 27, 1873] cannot be classed under the head of outbreaks or renewal of war . .

labors; he was working constantly to maintain order among the Indians on the reservations, as well as to bring the stragglers in. On July 16, General Crook issued General Orders No. 24,[7] in regard to carrying out Order No. 15 against the Apaches still at large, and the results obtained. Several important surrenders had taken place, and all the large bands of stragglers in northern Arizona had been brought in upon the reservations.

By September a large number of Indians were on reserva-

That there has been no more [discontent among the Indians on the reservations], is complimentary not only to the General's declaration of peace, but his management of the reservations." Tucson, Citizen, July 19, 1873.

[7] "First: Captain George M. Randall, 23rd Infantry, surrounded and captured the remnant of Del-shay's band with that notorious chief himself, in the Sierra Anchа Mountains on the 22d day of April.

"Second: The operations of the troops under Capt. Thomas McGregor, 1st Cavalry, in the Santa Maria Mountains, resulted in the surrender of Tonaspie's entire band of Apache-Mojaves on the 12th ultimo.

"Third: The operations of First Lieut. J. B. Babcock, 5th Cavalry, in Tonto Basin resulted in the surrender of the two bands of Tonto-Apaches under Ca-Chie and Naqui-naquies.

"Fourth: Reports have just been received of the operations of Capt. James Burns, 5th Cavalry, in Castle Dome and Santa Maria Mountains, resulting in the unconditional surrender of over two hundred Apache-Mojaves, believed to be the last remnant of all the straggling renegades in Northern Arizona. . .

"These operations have not only had the effect of bringing in upon their proper reservations all the stragglers in Northern Arizona, but have also taught those already in that no place outside of the limits prescribed is safe, and that while the government lends a helping and protecting hand to all Indians who wish to remain at peace and try to help themselves in peaceful pursuits, it still remains strong to punish those who prefer war and the fruits of plunder." Tucson, Citizen, July 26, 1873.

tions.[8] The Hualapais, numbering some eight hundred, were at Beale Springs, but as the region here was unproductive, their removal was desirable; however, they had an attachment for this location as the home of their fathers and refused to move, and later,[9] when the attempt was made to move them, they broke out and left for the mountains. The Apache-Mojaves and a portion of the Tontos, some two thousand, were on the Verde reservation. On account of the old feuds and tribal differences, they did not want to live together, but General Crook proved equal to the emergency, and no trouble resulted. The San Carlos reservation had been established late in 1872, and early in 1873 the Arivaipas, Pinals, a few Tontos, and some White Mountain Apaches, from twelve hundred to fifteen hundred, were placed upon it. This group, probably partly because of the mixed bands and also because they had lately been among the most hostile, had been the most restless. On the White Mountain reservation were sixteen hundred Apaches; their behavior had been good and their condition encouraging. On the Chiricahua reservation there were from eight hundred to twelve hundred, but there was no accurate check made of these Indians as there was on the other reservations. They were under the control of Captain Jeffords according to the treaty of General Howard and outside the pale of the military;[10]

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[8] Tucson, Citizen, September 6, 1873.

[9] 1874.

[10] "Among the turbulent spirits occupying the San Carlos Division of the White Mountain Reservation, there are al-

and since renegade Apaches took refuge on their reservation, they were blamed not only for their own misdeeds, but for the deeds of those who came through their reservation.[11]

The skirmishing parties were meeting with success. From September 30 to October 12, there had been an addition of fifty-seven at San Carlos, among them forty-eight Tontos who had not formerly been on the reservation.[12] As the Apaches continued to come in, now generally in small groups brought in by the troops, the news came that Washington, October 29, had recognized the meritorious work of General Crook in the promotion to a full brigadier- generalship.[13] There was general rejoicing not only throughout Arizona

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ways those ripe for deeds of blood, and when we remember that almost side by side with this reservation is another, the 'Chiricahua', whose Indians are constantly inciting those occupying the other reservations to break over the restraints thrown around them, goading them with the example of their own lawless irresponsible position, and showing them that they go and come as they please, and are growing rich in prizes of ponies and other plunder, taken from the defenceless people of Sonora, it is hardly to be wondered that trouble should come." General Crook, Report, 1873, 43, 15.

11 The Tucson, Citizen, October 18, 1873, reported that some Indians who had left Verde had been immediately followed by troops who were either to return them or destroy them. The command under Lieutenant Schuyler had met them at the east fork of the Verde and killed fourteen on October 3. The same paper, for October 25, reported that the command under Major Brown, which had been out from Camp Grant for several weeks, on the last of September had killed six warriors, one of them responsible for the death of an American, September 11, on Pinal Creek.

12 Tucson, Citizen, October 25, 1873.

13 The Tucson, Citizen, November 8, 1873, reviewed the work of General Crook before taking command of Arizona as well as his accomplishments in Arizona. In regard to the promotion, it said: "Since the receipt of the dispatch announcing General Crook's assignment to command this Department, no such glorious and cheerful news has come to us from

and California[14] but throughout the Army, for the recognition of his merit was nation wide.

During 1873 several scouting expeditions against Apaches had been organized among the Pimas, but they had not been very successful and frequently reported no Apaches seen, due to the fact that these hostiles had been forced upon the reservations by the troops.[15] The peace made in 1872 between the Papagoes and the Arivaipa and Pinal Apaches had been kept because the olive branch offered by Howard had been followed by the sword in the hand of Crook. This was the first time in the recollection of the Papagoes that there had been peace between them.[16] The Apache-Mojaves from Date Creek, who had been moved to the Verde reservation,[17] were

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Washington. It is absolute evidence that President Grant recognizes and rewards true merit, and knows full well who can command aright in Arizona."

14 "The announcement of the promotion of General George Crook to a full Brigadier-Generalship will be hailed with joy throughout the Pacific coast . . . The Government, while it honors itself in honoring Crook, can never repay to him the debt it owes. He has accomplished in less than two years, the subjugation of a race of savages that has defied the military power of old Spain, of Mexico and the United States during a period which extends back nearly three hundred years." Excerpt from San Diego, Union, in Tucson, Citizen, November 13, 1873.

15 Report of J. H. Stout, agent of Gila River reservation, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1873, 649-651.

16 Report of R. A. Wilbur, agent of Papagoes, op. cit., 651-652.

17 "Anticipating a large exodus, so soon as this movement commenced, I made such disposition of the troops as would cause them to consider the matter, and consequent, the number that left was much smaller than I anticipated and included only about two hundred and forty (240) men, women and children, the remainder went peaceably to their reservations. Those that fled were followed by troops of the different

behaving well, but Mr. Williams, their agent, stated that a company of troops would be necessary for a time to keep them upon the reservation.[18] Early in the year the Indians from old Camp Grant had been moved to San Carlos, and although there had been several changes of agents during the year, they had been reasonably quiet. Immediately following the murder of Lieutenant Almy,[19] in May, on this reservation, Agent Larrabee had turned the agency over to Major Brown, as the representative of General Crook, giving as his reason that the Indians could only be controlled by the military.[20]

General Schofield in his annual report for 1873, in speaking of Arizona and General Crook, said:[21]

> The Department of Arizona . . . has been the theatre of active operations against hostile Indians -- operations characterized by consummate skill displayed in the plans of the departmental commander, and by gallantry and untiring energy of the officers and men engaged.

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commands and attacked wherever found until they surrendered; and they too went to their reservations." General Crook, Report, 1873, MS, 14.

18 "This aid has been, as far as this agency is concerned, promptly rendered, and I have found General Crook ready at all times to cooperate with me in the management of the Indians, and in seeking to make the present Indian policy of the Government a success. I am much indebted to him." Report of J. Williams, agent of Verde reservation, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1873, 656.

19 Lieutenant Almy, stationed at San Carlos, was murdered on May 27, 1873, and except for the intervention of friendly Indians Larrabee, the agent, would probably have suffered the same fate. Troops were sent in pursuit of the Apaches responsible and before long they were made to pay the penalty for the deed.

20 Report of Major Brown, acting agent at San Carlos, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1873, 657-658.

21 Report of General Schofield, op. cit., 51-52.

> With few exceptions the lately hostile Apaches have been forced to submit to authority, and are now living quietly upon the reservations assigned them.
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> Since the close of General Crook's campaign it has been found possible to diminish somewhat the cavalry force in that department, which had been increased to insure his success . . .
>
> The condition of Arizona is more hopeful than at any former period, and great credit is due for this improvement to the department commander and his subordinates.

He went on to say that the increased development and security in the Territory had diminished the cost of supplies for the troops; the military telegraph,[22] besides its military advantages, would greatly aid commercial business and promote the development of the Territory. Not only was the cost of supplies lowered with the cessation of hostilities, but also with the coming of peace the quartermaster's department had been able to dispense with the services of the pack-trains and thus a further economy for the Government had resulted.[23]

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[22] The first messages passed from San Diego to Prescott on November 22, 1873. They bore congratulations to General Crook upon his promotion to brigadier-general.

[23] General Crook, Report, 1873, MS, 2-3.

Chapter VIII

THE DIFFICULTIES OF 1874

In December of 1873 Lieutenant Schuyler completed a brilliant campaign in the Tonto Basin.[1] In January three commands, under Schuyler and Babcock from McDowell and Rice from Verde, moved in converging lines into the Basin.[2] Aside from skirmishes which took place between the troops on scouting expeditions after the small bands still at large and those few who from time to time left the reservations, the Territory had been free from bloodshed due to the Indians since April, 1873; however, the Indians at San Carlos broke out in 1874.

The night of January 4,[3] Eskiminzin, a chief of the Arivaipas, escaped confinement, and joined by his own band and followed by six other bands, fled to the mountains. Signal fires for their return were set immediately, and within a few days they returned. On account of the weather at this time of the year they were allowed to erect temporary lodges on the south side of the river; thus they were separated from the agency by a freshet during the last of the month. Eskiminzin and two other notorious chiefs,

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1 Tucson, Citizen, January 5, 1874.

2 The country traversed by each of these commands is given in the Tucson, Citizen, January 10, 1874.

3 The report of this outbreak is found in the report of John B. White, subagent at San Carlos, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1874, 502-504.

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1 Tucson, Citizen, January 3, 1874.

2 The country traversed by each of these commands is given in the Tucson, Citizen, January 10, 1874.

3 The report of this outbreak is found in the report of John B. White, subagent at San Carlos, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1874, 602-604.

Cochenay and Chuntz, crept in and mingled with these Arivaipas during this period. A flour train was attacked here on the last day of January, and all again fled to the mountains.[4] One group, led by Pedro,[5] on its way made an attack at old Camp Grant, killing two men, a woman, and two children.

The troops took the field in a more vigorous manner than ever, and the Citizen for the period recorded skirmish after skirmish, in which the savages were defeated. In two months the backbone of the revolt had been broken, and by the middle of April three hundred and fifty had been taken to San Carlos as prisoners.[6] Those that were returned to San Carlos were put to work digging the irrigation ditch and taking care of the crops they had planted before the outbreak.

Previously, when the Indians had repented, the military had accepted their promises in good faith, but now General Crook recognised as the time for harsh measures, since more lenient ones had not sufficed. He issued orders

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[4] "The outbreak at the San Carlos in January last was instigated by them [Cochenay and Chuntz], and might have assumed proportions that would have put in jeopardy all that had been done, but for the prompt and decisive movements of the troops, and the officers in command showing great skill and energy in the emergency, crushing it in the bud." Report of Crook, in Secretary of War, Report, 1874, 63.

[5] Tucson, Citizen, June 6, 1874, reported head of Pedro taken.

[6] "All the hostile Apaches are supposed to have left the north side of the Gila and are moving south and the soldiers and Indian allies are in hot pursuit, and if the same energetic work is kept up a few weeks longer, a permanent peace will be assured." Tucson, Citizen, April 18, 1874.

that these Indians should not be permitted to return to the reservation until the leaders should be brought in and surrendered, dead or alive.[7] The various commands then out turned back group after group who tried to surrender, until the Indians themselves joined in the search for those responsible for the disturbances.[8] General Crook reported:

> One after another of their followers deserted and joined the Indians, hunting them until finally they were killed -- Cochenay, on the 26th of May, and Chuntz, on the 25th of July.

Del-che, chief of the Pontos, who was still at large at the time peace was declared in April, 1873, surrendered on April 22 of that year to Major Randall and his command at Canyon Creek with one hundred and thirty-two of his band.[9] At that time he was placed on the White Mountain reservation, where Agent Roberts kept close watch over him; however, on the last of June, a little dissatisfaction on that reservation led to his desertion with twenty-four warriors.[10] He arrived at the Verde reservation on August 4, with a few warriors; he claimed that his life had been threatened by the Indians at Camp Apache, so General Crook,[11] willing to credit this, had requested that he should be received in

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[7] Report of Crook, in Secretary of War, Report, 1874, 65.

[8] Ibid., 65.

[9] Tucson, Citizen, July 26, 1873.

[10] Ibid., July 12, 1874.

[11] "He [Del-che] has, at one time or another, been a 'peaceful' suppliant for pardon at all the agencies and military posts in Eastern, Central and Northern Arizona, and each time has signalled his departure, which usually fol-

case he should come in. At Camp Verde, however, he was told that this would be his last chance to prove his sincerity. While he was at this reservation, he and his followers surrounded the whites on the reserve and would have murdered them except for the timely intervention of a number of scouts and other friendly Indians. He returned to the reservation only once more, when he persuaded a few others to join him. He lost his life at the hands of his own people near Turret Butte in August, 1874.[12] With the deaths of these notorious chiefs the troublesome element was removed from the Indian population of the Verde, San Carlos, and Apache agencies.

General Crook felt that the problem of the Apaches now resolved itself into a problem of adjustment. He saw work as the cure for all evils. If the Indians were properly managed, kept at work, furnished with seeds and implements, he saw no trouble for the future, as they would gradually become self-supporting. In fact, he considered that government supplies should be gradually withdrawn, so that they would become industrious, earning what they consumed. The land contained in the San Carlos, Verde, and

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lowed hard upon his surrender, by thefts . . . or cold-blooded massacre . . . Report of Crook, in Secretary of War, Report, 1874, 63.

[12] "Twenty-two San Carlos Apache scouts arrived at Camp McDowell on the 20th instant. They came from the Tonto country and brought with them, Del-che's head and report taking 120 prisoners and killing twenty-five Indians. No white soldiers were with the party." Dispatch from Phoenix, August 21, in Tucson, Citizen, August 22, 1874.

White Mountain reservations was some of the finest in the Territory; the crops for 1874 had been good, and the Indians had prepared their fields for larger crops for the following year. At Verde, under the instruction of officers familiar with engineering, they constructed, without expense to the Government, an irrigation canal.[13]

General Orders No. 24 had established civil government among the Indians. General Crook desired every effort to be made to secure the adjustment of differences and the punishment of offenders by members of their own bands, and as a result those groups bringing about the disorder were being separated from the element for law and order. The Indians were not only prompt in the execution of justice, but often they were more severe on members of their own bands than Americans would have been in the same instances. Those off the reservations causing trouble were of course taken care of by the military.

After having forced the Indians upon the reservations, the big problem was to keep them there; for their custom for years past had been to use the reservations as means to obtain supplies between raids. General Crook instigated the daily counting of the Indians and a system of tagging, by means of which a careful check could be kept at all times of the whereabouts of every warrior upon a reservation. Although this was a necessary measure to make permanent the results of the campaigns, it did not go unchal-

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[13] Report of Crook, in Secretary of War, Report, 1874, 63.

lenged, as there were Indian agents who deemed it unnecessary.[14] A corresponding record of each tag, or metal disk, along with the number of members in the family and a personal description of the warrior, was kept by the officer in charge. As ration issues were made on these tags, the Indians guarded them carefully.[15] This careful check over their movements and the efficiency of the police force, composed of the scouts of the campaigns, made it almost impossible for Indians belonging to a reservation to commit any misdeed, no matter how small, without its being traced directly to the offender. The San Carlos agency had been taken over by John H. Clum[16] in August, 1874, and when General Crook inspected that reservation in September, he found it in excellent condition; the Apaches humbly acknowledged to him that they could not go to the mountains in safety.[17]

In December the Indians at Camp Apache were reported more contented than ever.[18] During the spring, when the troops were out after the San Carlos Indians, these Camp

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[14] Dr. Soule, agent at Apache, telegraphed the Indian commissioner in Washington in regard to this, but he received a reply to the effect that the Department would not interfere with any measures deemed necessary by General Crook. Tucson, Citizen, January 4, 1873.

[15] Sidney R. De Long, on a visit to San Carlos and Grant, reported that on ration day he had seen the Indians marched in line and counted under perfect discipline. Tucson, Citizen, August 29, 1874.

[16] Mr. Clum died in Los Angeles in April or May, 1932.

[17] Tucson, Citizen, October 3, 1874.

[18] Ibid., December 19, 1874.

Apache Indians had become the most faithful and best behaved Indians in Arizona. They cheerfully cooperated with the soldiers and gave valuable aid in bringing the hostiles to terms, and their services were of indispensable value, since at that time troops were being transferred, and these native scouts took a certain amount of responsibility for the renegades. The Indians had been brought near the post without any difficulty, and no Indians were allowed at the post with arms. Major Ogilby was in command, and he made a scout every five days over the reservation to see if any were off the reserve. Each band was quartered in a separate group of huts, and all was kept in perfect order.[19] In commendation of the officers in charge of these reservations, General Crook said:[20]

> Their positions have been most important, the duties onerous and dangerous, and they have shown themselves equal to the emergencies that have been constantly arising.

The sickness prevailing among the Indians at Camp Verde in 1873 had practically disappeared by the autumn of 1874, and the officer in charge had been requested to move them to temporary camps on higher ground as the sickly season came on; General Crook reported about fifteen hundred on the reserve.[21] Of these Indians, Crook said:

> They have been among the worst in Arizona; but, if the Government keeps its promise to them, that it

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[19] Tucson, Citizen, December 19, 1874.

[20] Report of Crook, in Secretary of War, Report, 1874, 64.

[21] Ibid., 63.

> shall be their home for all time, there will be no difficulty in keeping them at peace and engaged in peaceful pursuits.
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> I sincerely hope that the interests that are now at work to deprive these Indians of their reservation will be defeated; but if they succeed, the responsibility of turning these fifteen hundred Apaches loose upon the settlers of Arizona should rest where it belongs.

With the advent of peace the control of the Indians had passed from the hands of General Crook to the Indian Bureau, and a certain group, known as the Indian ring, for purely selfish reasons was using its influence with the Bureau for the removal of certain Indians, among them the bands at Verde. When peace had been made with these and other bands, they had been led to believe that the reservations where they were then placed were to be theirs forever. The Indians are by nature very much attached to the land of their fathers, and a move from these lands would create dissatisfaction and lead to unnecessary bloodshed. General Crook was a man of his word, and he saw the dishonesty in the moving of these Indians as well as he foresaw the danger in it. Certain groups of the Indians were removed in 1874, and this policy then begun was carried on in the years to come, with very disasterous results in loss of life and money.

In January the Interior Department had ordered the removal of the Hualapais from their old home at Beale Springs to the Colorado River reservation. Because of their loyalty as scouts and their desire to remain in their own haunts, General Crook was opposed to their removal; his wishes were disregarded and their removal ordered, so he requested lib-

eral appropriations for them.[22] They were reluctant to go, but after consulting with them it was planned to move them on January 26. Before the move was made, however, the entire band left for the mountains, declaring that they would sooner die than move. They committed a few depredations before placing themselves in a strong position. Troops were dispatched to force their return, but floods delayed action until the officer in command at Beale Springs had succeeded in getting in touch with them. They sent word to Captain Byrne, who was in command at this post, that they would return if they would be permitted to remain in their old home, that they would obey all orders General Crook might send them, and if required to do so, they would pay for the stock stolen or killed, but that if the troops should attempt to drive them to the reservation on the Colorado, they would fight.[23] The Hualapais also stated that they would be willing to support themselves without government aid if they should be allowed to remain at Beale Springs. Captain Byrne, whom they all loved, persuaded them to return, and in April about six hundred were marched by the troops to the Colorado River reservation. After four months on this reservation their condition was deplorable; since they were

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[22] "Anticipating the early removal of these Indians to the Colorado Reservation, I shall exceedingly regret if their attachment to their old hunting grounds cause them to rebel. They have rendered invaluable service to the country in the late campaigns, and I trust that gratitude as well as humanity will prompt as liberal appropriations in their favor . . ." General Crook, Report, 1873, MS, 17.

[23] Tucson, Citizen, March 14, 1874.

mountain Indians, the excessive heat had been too much for them, and the glaring sun and drifting sand had caused most of their children to be almost blind; nearly half of their horses purchased to breed from perished from starvation; and they had lost the seeds for their crops because of the failure of the Colorado to overflow.[24] And such was the reward reaped by the Hualapais for their faithfulness, but General Crook was powerless to act.

Prices had always been high for supplies within the Territory, but during 1874 prices for transportation as well as for all kinds of stores furnished from the products of the country continued downward.[25] This, of course, lowered the cost of administration of the Department. Some supplies were purchased within the Territory, and an unbroken peace would mean a great reduction in the price of all kinds of meat purchased from the settlers. Hay, grain, and wood were among the supplies obtained from the Indians; Crook believed that if the Indian could see the results of his labor in money and the possibilities of its purchasing power, he would more easily forget the war-path and its possibilities in raids and plunder.

In August, 1874, the military telegraph[26] connecting

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[24] Report of Crook, in Secretary of War, Report, 1874, 64.

[25] Ibid., 65.

[26] $50,311.30 was appropriated by Congress in March, 1873, for this telegraph line to be built from San Diego to Prescott and Tucson. The line was built by troops, using the means of the Quartermaster's Department. It was

San Diego, Yuma, Prescott, and Tucson had been in operation ten months, and Congress had authorized the extension to Camp Apache. This telegraph had revolutionized the manner of communicating orders; the concentration and movements of troops was now a matter of hours where before it had required days and weeks. The commander could handle his troops from any point with ease and repidity, and successful outbreaks were now next to impossible.

During the year General Crook had continued his policy, begun the previous year, of concentrating the troops from small to large garrisons, but he had not accomplished much in this direction. The garrison at Beale Springs, due to the removal of the Hualapais, had been transferred to the Colorado; the other troops and garrisons remained practically the same as in the previous year, with the exception of temporary reduction due to the exchange of the Eight with the Twenty-third Infantry, then in progress.

Although Crook was a man of extreme modesty, he also had faith in his ability. There had been no hesitation in the manner in which he had taken over the Department, and not once during his entire administration did there seem to be any delay in his actions. He knew what to do and proceeded without delay to do it. He was, at the close of 1874, able to see some of the results of the peace which

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completed and in operation by December. The five hundred and forty miles had cost $45,000.00; the surplus wire was used to extend to Verde and Apache; thus the principal posts of Arizona were in immediate communication with each other, with headquarters of the Department, of the Military Division of the Pacific, at San Francisco, and with the War Department. In less than a year the cost had already been more than repaid in saving of expense and loss in pursuit of hostiles. Secretary of War, Report, 1874, x.

had been brought about by his policy of a vigorous campaign and the results of constructive measures in regard to the Indians after they had been placed upon the reservations. But with the establishment of peace certain matters relative to the management of the reservations passed from the hands of Crook to the Interior Department. We have seen the results of this in the removal of the Hualapais, allies of Crook from the beginning, from their home in the mountains. General Crook deplored this, and the conclusion of his last report while commanding in Arizona shows his attitude in the matter, and he voiced the following warning:[27]

> In conclusion, I mention the material prosperity which is apparent in the territory as the direct result of peace with the Apaches. It is to be hoped that there may be no mistakes in their management that will disturb this condition, for an Indian war, deplorable at all times, is much more to be deplored when it is the result of violated faith on the part of the Government or its agents.

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[27] Report of Crook, in Secretary of War, Report, 1874, 55.

Chapter IX

THE CLOSE OF CROOK'S ADMINISTRATION

Conclusion

In the autumn and winter of 1874, General Crook made a last tour of the Department.[1] He found, according to Bourke, who accompanied him, satisfactory conditions existing, the Indians working and in good spirits. In this tour of inspection he visited the Moquis on the northern side of the Little Colorado. The Apaches had reported that this tribe had provided them with arms and ammunition, which they in turn had purchased from the Mormons and Utes. General Crook cautioned them against aiding any tribes in hostility to the Government, and his advice was well received.

In his message to the Legislature in 1875,[2] Governor Safford called attention to the satisfactory condition of Indian affairs and to the certainty that Arizona would never again see a general war with the Indians. He spoke in praise of the Department commander,[3] and expressed the belief that his policy carried to its completion would result in the Indians becoming wholly self-sustaining.

Crook was thorough in all that he did, and he was not

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[1] Bourke, On the Border with Crook, 230.

[2] Tucson, Citizen, January 9, 1875.

[3] "Gen. Crook, in the subjugation of the Apaches, has sustained his former well earned military reputation, and deserves the lasting gratitude of our people." Ibid.

to be satisfied until every Apache was on a reservation and at work. Advices from his headquarters on February 25, 1875, to the effect that Major Ogilby's command had just completed a clean sweep between the Mogollon range and the Little Colorado, killing among others those responsible for certain depredations and whom Crook had been after for some time, again showed the thoroughness with which the commanding general carried out his work.[4]

The San Carlos Indians were among those most carefully watched within the Territory.[5] Mr. Clum had them in complete control; they were orderly, quiet, and obedient. They were required to attend the daily count,[6] and no Indian was allowed to be absent from the camp for more than a day. They were never permitted to leave the reservation except on scouts or as guides for traveling parties; when they acted as guides, permits were issued for one or two to go, with instructions not to leave the party under any pretext. All arms were in the possession of the agent and were given out for hunts and checked in. These Indians labored diligently and saved their money from their labor and from the sale of wood, hay, and grain, and with it had purchased some horses.

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[4] Tucson, Citizen, February 27, 1875.

[5] Ibid., March 20, 1875.

[6] There was a daily count of all men until May 1, and the women and children were counted every Saturday. Since their behavior was good, after May 1 they were counted only once a week. Report of J. P. Clum, agent at San Carlos, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1875, 741.

During the early part of March, 1875, Colonel Dudley, acting under the Interior Department, was busy moving the Indians from Verde to San Carlos, some fourteen hundred;[7] he also had orders to move the Chiricahuas to the Hot Springs agency in New Mexico, but this move was not made until later.[8] General Crook had protested against the removal of these Indians from Verde, because of their understanding concerning this as their permanent home, but other influences were more powerful, the Indians were now subjugated, and Crook's voice was not heard.[9] They moved reluctantly, believing that they would be forced. These Indians, when they arrived at San Carlos, refused to give up their arms; but on March 27, after a parley, the Tontos walked up and surrendered theirs, and within a day or so after this the Apache-Mojaves surrendered theirs. These groups had never before been without arms, and it had taken Crook's vigorous campaigns to bring about this willingness to comply with the demands of the agent. The Apache agency had been consolidated with the San Carlos, and these Indians were moved in July; there were then four thousand two

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[7] Report of Clum, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1875, 717.

[8] 1876.

[9] "Gen. Crook assured me that neither himself or his officers would place any obstacles in the way of removal, and that he would afford me every assistance in his power, except to compel them to remove by military force; and when the move was decided upon, Gen. Crook did afford me every facility for transportation at his command." Excerpt from report of Colonel Dudley, special commissioner, in report of E. P. Smith, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, op. cit., 544-545.

hundred and thirty-three Indians on the San Carlos.[10] Because of the hereditary hatred of the several tribes, a portion of them were placed on the north side of the Gila and the remainder on the south side. There might be removals and changes on the reservations, but the war was over, and had been for several months.

This policy of concentration of all Apaches in Arizona was carried on and enforced; the Indians from Camp Apache had been transferred in July, and a portion who had formerly affiliated with Cochise went willingly, but the majority had refused to move, saying that they would take care of themselves if let alone; the agents had threatened to use force and had burned the agency building, but without result, for these Indians would not consent to live in the hot valley of the San Carlos.[11]

The Apache was conquered and life and property were safe in Arizona for the first time in a number of years, the task for which Lieutenant Colonel George Crook, now Brigadier General, had been sent to the Territory. There were Indian troubles elsewhere, and on March 11, 1875, General Crook was assigned to the Department of the Platte,[12] and Colonel

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[10] Report of Clum, in Secretary of the Interior, Report, 1875, 717.

[11] Report of General Schofield, in Secretary of War, Report, 1875, 122. Mr. Clum, who helped move these Indians, said that those who remained did so with his permission. His report shows that he was antagonistic toward the military in a number of instances, and this probably accounts for this discrepancy.

[12] Tucson, Citizen, March 13, 1875.

Kautz assigned to Arizona. In 1873, when the Modocs had gone on the war-path, there was fear on the part of the people of Arizona that Crook might then be transferred; but in 1875, although has departure was regretted, he had the Department in such satisfactory condition that no distrust was expressed as he departed on March 25 for his new post.

Colonel Kautz assumed command feeling that the success of Crook had been so great that he might not fulfil the expectations of the people of the Territory, but the hearty cooperation of the officials and post commanders soon removed any fear he had in regard to this. Most important to us is his report concerning the change of policy in regard to the Indians, a fulfilment of the fear expressed by Crook.[13] The Indians could not understand how it was that the agents rather than the military, with whom they had made peace, had control of them. Colonel Kautz called attention to the increased security to life and property within the Territory, which had encouraged immigration and industry quite noticeably.[14] During the year extensions of the telegraph had been made to Lowell and Verde, and the line was being extended to Apache, Grant, and San Carlos.

General Schofield, who had watched the progress of the Verde and White Mountian Indians on their reserves, where they were fast becoming self-supporting, felt the unfairness to the Indians in their removal and deprecated the un-

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[13] Report of Colonel Kautz, commanding Department of Arizona, in Secretary of War, Report, 1875, 113.

[14] Ibid., 137.

doing of the efforts of the military.[15] These efforts of the Department of the Interior toward economy, although they resulted in economy for that Department, merely added to the expense of the War Department in the undoing of its work.[16]

The work of Crook's first administration over, we are able to cast a backward glance over the four years he was in command in order to see it as a complete whole, and to see wherein lay the reasons for his complete success.

He left the Territory in peace, the Indians upon reservations, industrious, working toward their self-support, aided by irrigation canals which had been constructed at small expense to the Government, and keeping order on the reserves through the efforts of their own police force. He had proved himself not only an Indian fighter but also an organizer. He did not, however, limit his efforts to the improvement of the Indians alone;[17] he broke up sickly posts and transferred garrisons to elevated locations, such as Camp Grant; he connected every post in the Department with every other post by first class roads. In some instances where roads already existed, he reduced the length and perfected them to such an extent that practically new roads resulted, as between Camps Whipple and Verde. Quar-

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15 "But now all this, that had been so wisely and well done by the only men who were capable of doing it at all, must be undone by the civil agents of the Indian Department as soon as they get control." Report of General Schofield, in Secretary of War, Report, 1875, 121.

16 Ibid., 122.

17 Bourke, On the Border with Crook, 232.

ters occupied by the men and officers were made more comfortable by repairs or replaced by new ones; every camp was provided with good, pure drinking water.[13] Each scouting party had been instructed to map its own trail and send the results to headquarters to be incorporated in a general map of the Territory; Arizona had been previously unknown and no attempt had been made to map it. A telegraph line had been constructed, which not only aided the military in its work, but also meant much to the people of the Territory.

There were two methods which General Crook could have employed in his war against the Apaches. He was fighting Indians, and he was fighting them in their own country, where the advantages were all with the enemy, who knew every nook and corner of that country. He must either train his own men in Indian warfare and scouting and in the knowledge, or else use Indians themselves in tracking the hostiles. The latter was the only practical solution. He used savage against savage, and these scouts never betrayed him. In this manner he could not only locate the strongholds of the hostiles but also attack them when they least suspected. In the campaigns which followed he destroyed their patches of corn and beans, and laid waste their rancherias, hunted them in the mountains, giving them no time for rest, attacked them in their mountain fastnesses, capturing their provisions and stock; if a small band escaped, it was immedi-

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[13] In the further development of the military posts, Crook desired to plant trees and vines at the various posts, but his transfer came before the project could be carried out. Bourke, On the Border with Crook, 234.

ately followed. His was a war of extermination or surrender; it brought peace to the Territory and protection to the Indians.

He knew the Indians, and he knew their type of warfare. Frederick Bechdolt wrote of him:[19]

> Crook's understanding of the Indian was perfect; and not only was he able to beat the natives at their own game of ambuscade, but he thoroughly sympathized with their cause . . .
>
> It was therefore with the utmost willingness that he combined his campaign of savage fighting with another and quieter campaign of diplomacy which was being waged by General O. O. Howard.

His years of experience among the Indians gave him this knowledge and understanding of them,[20] which he could not have obtained elsewhere.[21] Patrick Hamilton wrote of him:

> No man in the United States has ever gained such a thorough knowledge of Indian character or has such a complete mastery over those under his charge as General Crook. With the exception of the years of the civil war, . . . Crook has been without cessation upon the border engaged with the worst savages upon the American continent. No tribe has ever proved so formidable as the Apaches, but they found a master in Crook, who has performed more arduous and successful work upon the frontier than all the other generals of our military establishment put together.

General Crook never broke a promise to the Indians, and they trusted him at all times. He understood them, and they knew him for their friend; General Howard wrote of him in

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[19] Frederick R. Bechdolt, When the West was Young, 205.

[20] "His look was determined, his bearing reserved, shy and dignified, and his speech laconic, and this with his other peculiarities . . . that owing to his long service on the frontier and frequent Indian campaigning, he had acquired not a few of the peculiarities of the red man." Lieutenant Colonel O. L. Hein, Memories of Long Ago, 94.

[21] Patrick Hamilton, The Resources of Arizona, 115.

this respect:[22]

> He was indeed a favorite with the Indians, and though terrible in his severity when they broke out and made war, and perhaps at all times distrustful of them, yet he believed in keeping his word with an Indian as sacredly as with a white man, and in all his dealings with them he was uniformly just and kind.

General Crook was quiet, modest, shy, and retiring; there was nothing of pomp and ceremony about him. When he arrived in Tucson to take command, he arrived unannounced, as his departure from San Francisco had been, and even the stage driver did not know who his passenger was. The old grey canvas suit he wore at all times on his campaigns, along with his ability to outwit them at their own game, caused the Indians to call him Grey Fox. General Crook talked very little, but he listened well; nothing escaped his keen observation. He was a man of boundless energy, who never showed fatigue; and although his marches followed in quick succession, never allowing the Indians time for recuperation, he was always the most alert and active man of his command. General Howard wrote of him:[23]

> Crook was a peculiar man. . . He was even more reticent than Gen. Grant, carefully keeping all his plans and thoughts to himself. He was very temperate in eating, . . and at the time I saw him he was so strong and muscular that he appeared never to be troubled with fatigue. . .
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> The general had that art which some men possess of saying very little to you in conversation, being at the same time such an attentive listener that one was unconsciously drawn out in discourse.

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[22] O. O. Howard, My Life and Experiences among our Hostile Indians, 152.

[23] Ibid., 152.

In 1902, Major Elmer Smith, of the Twelfth Cavalry, wrote concerning him:[24]

> Crook grasped the question with a broader view and deeper thought than any man before or since. His methods were simple. . . inflexible in his punishment . . . patiently examined all complaints . . . treated them more honestly and squarely. Unconscious of danger, unmindful of treachery, never misled by deceit, not disturbed by failure, the strongest of them found their wills bend to his.

Very little has been written of this great Indian fighter, and the reason for this may be seen in the closing chapter of Bourke's book:[25]

> No man could attempt to write a fair description of General Crook's great services and his noble traits of character unless he set out to prepare a sketch of the history of the progress of civilization west of the Missouri. . .
>
> Crook's modesty was so great, and his aversion to pomp and circumstance so painfully prominent of his character and disposition, that much which has been here related would never be known from other sources.

Perhaps no more fitting close could be found than the following, from the Adjutant General's Office, announcing the death of General Crook, March 21, 1890:[26]

> General Crook was as truthful and sincere as he was fearless and brave -- combined qualities admirably fitting him for the exacting duties in which he was so long engaged upon the frontier. He could treat with the Indians successfully, for their faith in his honesty in the council was as strong as their fear of his courage and sagacity in the field. A true soldier, a good citizen, faithful to duty, upright of purpose, considerate to his inferiors, simple and modest in his demeanor toward all, his life and example may well be commended to all young men, and especially those of the Army in which he so honorably served.

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[24] McClintock, History of Arizona, I, 225.

[25] Bourke, On the Border with Crook, 490-491.

[26] Adjutant General, General Orders No. 32, March 22, 1890.

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